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SUMMARY
This dissertation investigates how human capital influences decision-making and per-
formance at the firm- and household-level. It has three empirical studies. The first two
essays focus on the firm-level managerial human capital. We discuss how to measure the
leadership’s human capital precisely, and how it affects corporate innovation and produc-
tivity. The third one analyzes how household heads’ personality traits influence risky in-
vestment decisions.
The first two essays focus on firm-level study. The first one investigates how a firm’s
managerial human capital influence its total factor productivity (TFP) via the potential
channels of technology progress and efficiency improvement. As the main operation partic-
ipants, we use the CEO’s previous experiences and the composition of the top management
team (TMT) to enrich the measures of their human capital. We find that CEO’s manage-
ment vitality and innovative incentives promote TFP, while TMT’s diversity impedes TFP.
In the second essay, we further explore whether a firm’s innovation incentive is the
bridge to link managerial human capital and higher productivity. As the major decision-
makers, we consider the human capital of the CEO and board of directors (BOD), using
similar proxies in the first essay to measure it. The results imply that CEO and BOD’s
career experiences in various functions, as well as some special experiences, all influence
their innovation incentives.
To give a broad picture of human capital measurement and its impacts on different
levels of the national economy, we shift to household-level research in the third essay. We
investigate how household head’s risk attitude in different domains, general and financial,
influences the investment decision on different types of financial products. We find that
risk-averse persons are more reluctant to invest in risky assets and allocate less wealth on
them as well, with a more notable impact on riskier assets. Additionally, financial risk




Human capital has prolonged impact on different aspects of national economy, from
individual-level to firm-level. Besides the objective constraints and conditions, human be-
ing plays a more important role in economic activities through decision-making and action-
taking. As the important economy participants, strategies taken by the corporations and
households would largely influence the wealth accumulation, social welfare, market reg-
ulation and so on. Therefore, investigating how their human capital is accumulated and
measured would be of great value.
This dissertation therefore investigates the human capital measurement by discussing
how it is gained. The first two essays explore the measurement of leadership’s human
capital at firm-level. Unlike the general employee’s human capital, decision-makers’ hu-
man capital plays crucial roles in strategic decision and daily operation. Therefore, for the
decision-makers or top executives, some specific aspects of their human capital, such as
leadership, collaboration ability, etc., are way more important rather than the general hu-
man capital. In this sense, their managerial human capital cannot be simply measured by
their demographic characteristics or general experiences, which is widely discussed, be-
cause they only explain a small proportion of the human capital formation. We thus adopt
some special experiences to better measure leadership’s managerial human capital, enrich-
ing the measurement proxies. These special experiences include the overseas experiences,
government backgrounds, and most importantly, career experiences in various functions.
In these two firm-level studies, we use the main database China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) with the sample of publicly listed manufacturing firms in
China, covering the post-crisis period 2008-2016. In the empirical analysis, we assume
CEO appointment process is a matching of CEO’s special experiences to firm’s objective
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needs. One crucial issue is that, based on the panel data structure, decision-makers and ex-
ecutives’ special experiences rarely change overtime due to the nature of dummy variables.
The traditional methods to address the endogeneity issue, which are Fixed Effect (within
method) and First-Difference estimations, are thus not the optimal strategies. Therefore,
we adopt the RE-IV method with Hausman-Taylor instruments (finding instruments within
the panel system, which are time-demeaned time-variant regressors) to address the endo-
geneity caused by CEO appointment. We also control the persistent trend of TFP and R&D
investment by constructing a dynamic specification. It helps us to see the impacts of CEO,
BOD and TMT’s human capital on firm’s innovation incentives and performance in a long-
run framework. To address a similar endogeneity issue in dynamic view, we expand the
Hausman-Taylor RE-IV method in the baseline, borrowing the idea from system-GMM to
search for extra instrument.
We further expand our human capital research to the household-level in the third essay.
To measure household heads’ risk attitude in different domains, we use test-based indica-
tor to proxy for the general risk attitude, and use the self-reported debt tolerance level to
measure the risk attitude in finance facet. We explore the impacts of risk attitude in these
two domains from both the aspects of long-run investment propensity and the instantaneous
financial behaviors under a special market condition. We adopt the Probit estimation for
long-run propensity, and use the Tobit method for instantaneous investment propensity and
depth. Additionally, we broaden the research scope to the heterogeneous impacts of risk
attitude on different financial products with different levels of uncertainty.
We make the following contributions to the firm- and household-level human capital
research. First of all, besides the demographic factors and general experiences, we en-
rich the measures of managerial human capital by also considering CEO, BOD and TMT’s
experience-based indicators, including overseas, government and functional backgrounds.
These proxies better reflect leaders’ specific unobservable human capital factors, such as
cognitive skills, managerial abilities, risk preference, etc.. Second, instead of only focusing
2
on a single person or a team, we consider a firm’s aggregated managerial human capital by
taking both individual- and team-level factors into account. In R&D investment strategy,
CEO and BOD are both considered by referring to their roles played in decision-making
process, while in promoting productivity, CEO and TMT’s managerial human capital is
taken into account due to their duty of practical implementation. Finally, rather than target-
ing at the financial outcomes, we step further to provide a practical way (TFP) to achieve
higher profitability, giving more practical implications.
The rest of dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses whether CEO’s
human capital and TMT composition, reflected by the experience-based indicators, can im-
prove firm’s productivity. Chapter 3 presents the relationship between CEO/BOD’s human
capital and firm’s innovation propensity. Chapter 4 investigates how household heads’ risk
attitude in both general and finance domains influence households’ stock and fund invest-
ment. Chapter 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
LEADERSHIP’S HUMAN CAPITAL AND CORPORATE TOTAL FACTOR
PRODUCTIVITY
2.1 Introduction
Raising productivity to spur profitability is the main goal of manufacturing firms. Be-
sides increasing the input quantity, raising the remaining unexplained part of productivity,
which is the total factor productivity (TFP), is the fundamental driving force to achieve
the long-run growth. Two major channels that lead to higher TFP are efficiency promotion
and technology progress. The former refers to both production and management efficiency,
influenced by input quality, governance structure and management strategies. The latter is
related to a firm’s propensity and capacity to innovate, as well as the technology spillovers.
Many papers thus investigated the determinants and influencing factors of a firm’s pro-
ductivity (Syverson, 2004; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). The internal factors include the
quality of production inputs, R&D devotion, firm structure, etc. (Aw et al., 2008). Exter-
nally speaking, technology spillovers, market competition, international trade, and relevant
policy all contribute to the TFP growth (Cassiman et al., 2010). Leadership and general
staffs also play the important roles in operation, so their impacts on firm performance re-
ceived growing attention in recent years (Schmitz, 2005; Bandiera et al., 2020).
For general human capital, skilled workforce promotes firm’s R&D efforts and ef-
ficiency, thus spurring productivity (Tang and Wang, 2019). As the efficient methods to
improve general or specific skills of the workforce, on-job training and work-life programs
have positive impacts on productivity (Konrad and Mangel, 2000). Besides the average
level, skill composition in the workforce also influences productivity. Autonomous groups,
team collaboration, and hierarchy dissolution all contribute to TFP (Zwick, 2004). Ethnic-
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ity, education, and demographic diversity all potentially influence productivity (Iranzo et
al., 2008; Parrotta et al., 2014).
Although many papers realize the importance of leadership in strategic planning, oper-
ation supervision and practical implementation, most of them only focus on the managerial
practice or control power (Chang and Hong, 2019). Measured by executives’ sharehold-
ings, the managerial ownership is positively related to the productivity in terms of a larger
control power (Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999). High-quality managerial practices and tal-
ents, measured by managers’ info on the operations, monitoring, targets, and incentives,
all drive productivity (Syverson, 2011). Unfortunately, seldom of these papers discuss the
relevant topic by targeting on the managerial human capital, such as executives’ managerial
skills, cognitive ability, and personality.
To explore the influencing factors of productivity also has applicable significance in
China. Due to a diminished demographic dividend with a declining trend of labor force
ratio, the labor cost in China kept growing after the financial crisis 2008.1 As a result, the
price competitiveness of “made-in-China” products in the world market reduced, causing a
shrinking market demand. Moreover, many Chinese firms still engage in the lower-end of
the production chain, producing, processing, and assembling factor-intensive products with
low value-added and technical content. In recent years, Chinese manufacturing firms real-
ized that TFP is the key to sustainability, thus devoting more to the technology promotion.
In this context, investigating how to build an innovative and efficient production system is
of great value in Chinese case. Among all influencing factors, the notable importance of
managerial human capital should not be neglected. Therefore, in this chapter, we investi-
gate the importance of managerial human capital in firm’s productivity promotion in the
context of Chinese manufacturing industry.
1Based on the report of Oxford Economics, the annual salary of a representative worker in China is 1500
RMB in 2009 but becomes 4000 RMB at the end of 2016.
5
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Based on the existing literature (Griliches, 1979; Syverson, 2011), to make the expo-
sition clearly, we assume a multiplicatively separable expression of productivity:
Y = A · F (K,L,M) (2.1)
Y is the overall production output. F (.) is a production function of production input quan-
tities of three major factors for manufacturing firms, which are capital stock K, labor input
L, and intermediates M , respectively. F (.) increases monotonically with a diminishing
marginal return, so we have F ′(.) > 0 and F ′′(.) < 0.
The factor-neutral shifter A is defined as the TFP. It captures the remaining part of
productivity unexplained by the input quantity. TFP has many sources due to its inclusion
of all ignorance, so we express it as:
TFP = A(T,G; v) (2.2)
T and G are two major sources, which are technology progress and efficiency improve-
ment. v is a composited error, including all other sources, unobserved heterogeneous and
idiosyncratic error.
EfficiencyG depends on a series of operation and production practices. From manage-
ment aspect, it is affected by managers’ ability to attract, integrate, and allocate resources,
as well as lead and coordinate production process. From production aspect, it depends on
workforce’s skills to implement the production efficiently. Therefore, we can express G as:
G = G(MHC,LHC,X1) (2.3)
In equation (2.3), MHC and LHC are therefore the human capital of firm’s leadership and
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general labor force, respectively. X1 is a bunch of firm-level controls.
Technology T depends on firm’s absorptive capacity of R&D propensity, innovation
ability and technology spillovers. It is created and developed as a byproduct of manufac-
turing operation (Audretsch and Belitski, 2020).2 Higher efficiency smooths the innovation
process, so leading to a higher technology. Therefore, T can be expressed as a function of
efficiency G and other constraints X2:
T = T (G,X2) (2.4)
To summarize, we plug equation (2.3) and (2.4) into (2.2), and organize it as:
TFP = A(MHC,X, v) (2.5)
where X refers to all other influencing factors except managerial human capital, including
firm characteristics, financial condition, labor force human capital, market condition, etc.
In equation (2.5),MHC is unobservable and aggregated, so we need to identify whose
human capital are included. CEO plays important roles in making decision, leading and
coordinating teamwork, monitoring and controlling operation process. Top management
team (TMT) supports the decision-making and implements the strategical plans.3 Due to
their important duties, both CEO and TMT’s human capital should be considered as the
influencing factors of TFP.
To further discuss how MHC aggregates, we first consider individual’s managerial
human capital of CEO and each TMT member, which has additive impact on TFP. CEO’s
leadership, managerial skills, and resource absorption all contribute to TFP. TMT members’
managerial capacity and collaboration skills also have the similar impacts.
2 Many papers argue that technology progress is also motivated by operational inefficiency. The operation
condition influences absorbing capacity via resource integration and R&D promotion.
3 Top management team includes CEO, CFO, COO, CTO, and others higher than vice manager position.
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Therefore, we start with the formation of individual human capital, expressed as:
hct = f(et, lt, xt) (2.6)
f(.) is a Mincer Equation in general form.4 Individual’s human capital mainly accumulates
via formal education et and learning-by-doing lt. xt represents one’s demographic charac-
teristics, which also captures the aging effect of human capital depreciation. In most cases,
xt and et are only the secondary considerations in appointing the leadership, and both of
them seem to be fixed by the time of entering workforce. Therefore, their impacts on TFP
are limited.
In contrast, human capital gained via learning-by-doing lt is more important in lead-
ership selection, which is unobserved (Fitzsimmons and Callan, 2016). In the original
Mincer Equation, it is measured by the years of experiences in the industry for the labor
force. However, for top managers, due to their roles of decision-making and implemen-
tation in daily operation, years of working experiences are not sufficient to capture some
specific human capital factors, such as managerial skills and coordinating ability. Instead,
they can be better measured by various types of job tasks wt, occupation experiences ot,
and some special experiences st:5
lt = g(ot, wt, st) (2.7)
Due to a limited information on job tasks, individuals’ previous occupations are the rea-
sonable alternative measures of their human capital accumulation via learning-by-doing. It
can be expressed as:
ot = o(o
1, . . . , ok; ot1, . . . , otk) (2.8)
4 Many papers assume a linear form of Mincer Equation. We provide a general equation here to make
the exposition and explanation clear, while assuming it is linear in the empirical model.
5 Special experiences include, but not limit to, overseas experiences, government and so on.
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where oi (i = 1, . . . , k) is each occupation experience, and oti is its corresponding length.
To sum up, we integrate and rewrite the individual human capital equation (2.6) as:
hct = f [et, xt, wt, st, o(o
1, . . . , ok; ot1, . . . , otk)] (2.9)
Due to the additive impact of individual’s human capital, the collection of CEO and
TMT member’s diversified experiences widens the spectrum of firm’s managerial human
capital. Besides this additive impact, the collaboration among team members influences
the management efficiency. In this case, experience heterogeneity may also result in coor-
dination inefficiency due to diversified managerial goals and styles. Since team interaction
and coordination are relatively complicated and firm-specific, we use the team composition
in each human capital characteristic as the proxies, including age, gender, tenure, etc.
Based on above analysis, the composited managerial human capital is expressed as:
MHC = H(CEO, TMT ) (2.10)




t ] is TMT’s com-
posited human capital, including additive human capital of each member hcaddt , and the
coordination or interaction effect measured by the team composition hcintt .
In the next section, we discuss which experiences of CEO and TMT play important
roles in shifting TFP, as well as their influencing mechanism. Moreover, how to use team
composition to measure team’s coordination efficiency will also be discussed.
2.3 Data Resources and Variables Selection
We include publicly listed manufacturing firms in China as the original sample, cov-
ering the period 2008-2016.6 We use the main data source the China Stock Market and
6 TFP is more crucial for manufacturing industry, so we focus on manufacturing firms listed in the main
board (A shares), SME board (Small and Medium Enterprises) and GEM board (Growth Enterprises Market).
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Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) to get the information of firm and leadership’s
traits. To estimate TFP, the information to calculate the intermediate cost comes from the
Resset database. The info of price index deflators is sourced by the National Bureau of
Statistics in China.
The original database contains 12,591 firm-year observations for 1,937 firms. Among
these samples, we drop the extreme-sized firms with average number of employees less
than 300 or more than 100,000 during 2008-2016, because they potentially have different
production and operation modes with other normal-sized firms. After data cleaning, the
unbalanced panel data set includes 11,236 firm-year observations for 1,742 firms covering
the years of 2008-2016.7
In this section, we introduce how to measure the managerial human capital and firm-
level controls by using specific proxies. The dependent variable (TFP) cannot be measured
directly, so we introduce its estimation strategy in detail in the next section.
2.3.1 Measures of CEO and TMT’s Human Capital
For CEO’s general experiences, education attainment reflects one’s cognitive ability
and knowledge reserve. With higher education, CEO has higher management flexibility
and stronger innovation capacity (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; King et al., 2016). Human
capital gained via general industrial experiences is more valuable in practical sense, includ-
ing social skills, cognitive ability and so on. Leadership tenure reflects CEO’s familiarity
and sensitivity toward firm’s condition, problems, and threats. Longer tenure also indicates
a broader and deeper connection with collogues, implying better collaboration and larger
control power (Shen, 2003). However, it also leads to consistent management strategies,
reducing the operation vitality (Miller, 1991).
Overseas experience can be viewed as a proxy for one’s resource possession (Conyon
et al., 2019). Overseas CEOs get more exposure to advanced management system from
7 The information of CEO and TMT starts to be collected in 2008 with too many missing records after
the year 2017, so we choose the 2008-2017 time window.
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abroad.8 They also possess broader social tie to enlarge spillovers, cooperation opportu-
nity, and resource pool. Moreover, the creative mindset fostered by culture difference leads
to flexible management and active innovation. However, overseas CEOs face the adjust-
ment problem when transplanting managerial skills and resources gained from abroad into
Chinese industry.
Career experiences in various functions better capture CEOs’ human capital in a sense
of management.9 Based on Upper Echelon theory, CEOs with the throughput experiences
(finance, accounting, production, etc.) focus more on efficiency improvement rather than
product R&D to maintain the sustainable growth due to limited energy and resources. Pro-
duction CEOs are more familiar with production process, so have higher incentive and
stronger ability to conduct process management. Finance/accounting CEOs potentially
possess more financial resources and tend to take financial strategies rather than innovation
due to task familiarity. With higher efficiency and lower technology, the overall impact of
production or finance/accounting CEO is ambiguous.
In contrast, to seek a long-run expansion, CEOs with the output experiences (market-
ing, R&D, etc.) prefer to take the technology innovation (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Marketing CEOs have better knowledge of the market needs and firm’s own products, thus
having higher incentives and capacity to innovate or invent new products. Innovative CEOs
have better perspective towards innovation, so they not only value the importance of R&D,
but also have higher sensitivity and capacity of selecting and conducting R&D projects.
Innovative CEOs also accumulate richer R&D resources via past working experiences.
Based on statistics, around 82% of the CEOs hold bachelor or higher degree with
upward trend during 2008-2016 (Table 2.1, Panel A). Average length of general experience
and leadership tenure also grew gradually.10 For CEO’s special experiences, almost all of
8 Though lacking the information on “in which country CEO got overseas experience”, we expect that
most overseas experiences are gotten from the developed counties with advanced managerial technique.
9 There are nine functional experiences in the CSMAR database. We combine the design or R&D (inno-
vation), as well as the finance and accounting due to task similarity. We ignore HR, law and management,
because extreme proportion of CEOs possess these experiences, leading to identification issue.
10 Tenure as leader means serving at TMT, board of directors or board of supervisor. We choose the
11
Table 2.1: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of CEO and TMT Factors
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them have the upward trends (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). Overseas CEOs increased notably from
3.2% to 8.6% during 2008-2016, though the magnitude is small. With large magnitudes and
rapid speed, marketing CEOs raised from 18.3% to 29.3% and innovation CEOs increased
from 22.5% to 29.7%. The proportion of finance/accounting CEOs is relatively smaller but
grew rapidly from 10.8% to 17%. Production CEO raised from 13% to 17% with smaller
magnitude and slow speed .
Figure 2.1: Time trends of career experience in various functions
Figure 2.2: Time trends of overseas experience and total number of career experiences
longest one if one takes multiple positions. The reasons include: (1) We only have the info of tenure in
leadership position, no info on other positions; (2) General position does not provide as many managerial
experiences as in the leadership team.
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We analyze the time patterns of CEOs’ special experiences for exiting and newly listed
firms separately.11 The trends for newly entered firms are unclear, while the upward trends
of existing firms are almost parallel to those of the entire samples.12 These patterns imply
that the importance of overseas and specific industrial backgrounds is gradually realized
as the need of globalization. Besides each of these functional experiences solely, the to-
tal number of them also has a distinctive impact on TFP. In 2008, CEOs with only one
functional experience account for 59.3%, decreasing rapidly to 31.2% in 2016. In contrast,
CEOs with 2, 3 and 4 experiences all increased steadily, implying a growing attention paid
to the diversity of CEO’s backgrounds. To avoid the multicollinearity between each func-
tional experience and their total number, we do not include the latter in the model, but its
importance cannot be neglected.13
For TMT’s factors, executives’ education level has similar impact as that of CEO’s
education. As to gender composition, females potentially bring in different mindsets and
managerial styles to correct information biases in operation (Dewatripont et al., 1999).
They are also more patient and better at communication, which not only helps smooth
the operation by reducing collaboration frictions (Liu et al., 2014), but also widens team’s
human capital spectrum by accelerating experience exchange among members (Adams and
Ferreira, 2009). Finally, females face implicit barrier to climb the career ladder due to
“glass ceiling”, so they have stronger skills and determination compared to male peers in
similar positions (Arfken, et al., 2004).
TMT’s age heterogeneity has bivariate impacts. On the one hand, members in different
ages have different mindsets, cognitive functions, and attitudes towards operation. There-
fore, gender diversity promotes team creativity, thus encouraging innovation and boosting
managerial vitality (Miller and Triana, 2009). However, on the other hand, age diversity
11 We use moving average to show time trend of existing firms by taking the average of last three years
(current, last one and last two years) to indicate the proportion of existing firms with certain CEOs.
12 The unclear trends for newly entered firms might be due to the strong IPO regulation in 2012–2014.
13 Though we only include 6 out of total 9 experiences, other three have extreme values (HR and Law
have lower than 1%, management has larger than 99%), so the level of collinearity should be very high.
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leads to collaboration friction, different managerial styles, and poor team integration, re-
sulting in lacking cohesion as the bi-products (Amason, 1996; Miller et al., 1998).
Tenure diversity measures the length of collaboration as executives in current firm.
Shorter period of collaboration leads to low operation efficiency due to higher communi-
cation costs and larger conflicts (Bernile et al., 2018). Junior and senior members have
different opinions towards firm conditions, so they prefer different operation strategies and
styles. Though diversified ideas will lead to adjustment problem, they also boost man-
agement vitality. Junior members may bring in new ideas and fresh mind, viewing firm’s
operation from a new angle.
Based on the descriptive statistics, the proportion of female members increased from
11.5% to 15.5% during sample period, and that of bachelor’s or higher degree executives
also raises from 77% to 81.5% (Table 2.1, Panel B). Though the average age and tenure
length both grew gradually during 2008-2016, we do not see the clear time trends for their
diversity measures due to the tradeoff between management vitality and smoothness.
2.3.2 Other Firm-level Controls
Firm size is considered in both absolute and relative sense, measured by the number
of employees and market share. Absolute size reflects more about firm structure. Larger
firms potentially have complex governance structure, leading to lower operation efficiency
(Dhawan, 2001). Larger firms also have weaker incentives to make radical changes due to
lower risk of bankruptcy. Relative scale reflects firm’s interaction with the external market.
Firms with larger market share have stronger capacity to attract, integrate, and allocate
various resources efficiently, supporting both production and innovation activities.
We also consider firm’s financial condition, measured by return to asset (ROA) and
debt to asset ratio. More profitable or less financially restricted firms have adequate re-
sources to support various activities, while firms with insufficient funds must give up plans
with high uncertainty (Fazzari et al., 1987). Resource shortage also leads to the distortion
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of resource allocation, and thus reduces both the production efficiency and technology level
(Chen and Guariglia, 2013).
Industry cluster in the big cities provides firms with richer resources and larger coop-
eration opportunity to promote the innovation and production activities. Industry cluster
also helps reduce the system costs due to economics of scale and location advantage, in-
cluding production and transportation expenses. Located in the big cities, firms also have
advantage in accelerating the flows of information and resources via industry chain, thus
further improving efficiency.
For ownership structure, state-owned firms (SOEs) have higher reputation and pol-
icy advantages to attract various resources (Bogart and Chaudhary, 2015). However, they
potentially have complex structure and costly operation process/mode which reduce pro-
duction efficiency. Less threatened by bankruptcy, together with the “social-welfare goal”,
SOEs also have lower incentives to be profit-driven (Parida and Mandheswaran, 2020).
According to the agency theory, TMT with larger shareholdings has lower dismission
pressure, so being more tolerant to the risky investments, such as R&D (Palia and Lichten-
berg, 1999). In contrast, executives with fewer shares target more on their own utility and
short-run benefits (Coles et al., 2012). Besides motivation, larger shareholdings also imply
stronger control power to integrate resources efficiently and respond to shocks quickly.
Based on descriptive statistics, number of employees dropped slightly right after crisis
from 2,536 to 2,389, and then recovered to around 3,000 (Table 2.2). Both ROA and debt to
asset ratio fluctuated across years without clear time trend. Market share decreased sharply
from 0.12 to 0.09 right after the crisis and stayed relatively stable after then. TMT share-
holding shows a clear upward trend from 3% to 9.6% during 2008-2016. The proportion
of SOEs dropped drastically from 49% to 22.5%, while that of firms located in big cities
increased gradually from 22.2% to 26.9%.14
14 General employee’s human capital also influences TFP. Unfortunately, we do not have its information
(such as the fraction of skilled labor). Since general employees are hired by matching their skills with firm’s
traits and needs, we assume their human capital is partially explained by firm factors, controlled in our model.
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Table 2.2: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Firm Controls and Dependent Variable
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2.4 Estimating Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
We discussed the measures of independent variables and controls in the last section.
For the dependent variable TFP, it is unobservable and thus needed to be estimated. We
start with the Cobb-Douglas function (2.11) in logarithm form, and then estimate TFP as
the residual in the equation (2.12):
yit = βkkit + βllit + βmmit + ωit + uit (2.11)
t̂fpit = yit − β̂kkit − β̂llit − β̂mmit (2.12)
yit, kit, lit,mit are the output level and three major factor inputs in logarithm form, respec-
tively. ωit is the unobservable TFP and uit is the idiosyncratic error.
Several semi-parametric methods, including Olley-Pakes (OP, 1992), Levinsohn and
Petrin (LP, 2003) and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (ACF, 2015), are widely used to address the
potential endogeneity sourced by the association between input factors and unobservable
ωit. The main differences across these methods are endogeneity assumptions on input
factors and the proxies selected.15 In this research, we assume both labor and capital inputs
are potentially determined or subject to change after other factors are decided. Therefore,
ACF method is used to allow the association between unobservable TFP and above two
inputs, with intermediates as the proxy.
In the implementation, as shown in Appendix A.1 Panel A, the number of employees
and deflated net fixed assets are adopted to measure the labor input lit and capital stock
kit.16 Without direct measures for intermediates mit, we calculate it based on various op-
eration costs. Deflated annual revenue is adopted as the measure of output yit (Jin, et al.,
15 OP and LP assume that only capital is endogenous. OP uses investment as proxy, while LP adopts
intermediates to avoid “zero-value”. ACF assumes both capital and labor are endogenous with intermediates
as proxy. Since TFP estimation is not the key to this paper, we do not provide the estimation steps in detail.
16 Brand-new equipment requires lower maintenance cost with higher efficiency compared to the used
ones. Some papers use other strategies to depreciate the fixed assets, such as using a constant industry-
specific depreciation rate based on historical data. Due to lacking relevant information, we regard that the net
value of fixed assets is a reasonable proxy.
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2019). Average annual revenue has an upward trending with moderate turbulence from
1.99 to 2.84 billion RMB during 2008-2016. Capital stock and intermediate inputs in-
creased from 0.74 to 1.24, and 1.69 to 2.18 billion RMB, respectively. Average number of
employees is relatively stable across year, between 2,400 and 2,800. These variables show
an abnormal pattern during 2009-2012 right after the financial crisis due to the potential
change of operation strategies reacting to the external shock.
Figure 2.3: Time trends of estimated ln(TFP)
Based on ACF results, the estimate of labor input in logarithm is 0.11, and that of
capital and intermediates are 0.05 and 0.84, respectively (Appendix A.1, Panel B).17 The
results imply a major role of intermediates in explaining the productivity for the manu-
facturing firms, followed by the labor and capital, which are intuitively reasonable. The
estimates of all inputs sum up to around one, indicating a constant return to scale for the
listed manufacturing firms in China. Shown in Figure 2.3, TFP in logarithm grew grad-
ually during 2008-2016 from 1.44 to 1.61, with fluctuation during 2011-2013 potentially
due to IPO regulation. We also estimate TFP with OP and LP methods as the further check.
The time trend is consistent across different methods, proved by the evidence that the cor-
relation coefficients between any two are higher than 0.93. Given this extremely strong
17 We set the replication of bootstrap as 200, which is more than enough for the results to converge. For
the model, we assume a fourth polynomial function which has enough orders.
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correlation, the results of our empirical work are not expected to vary substantially when
TFPOP or TFPLP are employed (Van Beveren, 2012).
2.5 Baseline Specification
Our baseline specification is based on equation (2.5). MHCit includes both CEO and
TMT’s managerial factors, which are CEOit and TMT it, respectively, referring to a col-
lection of their basic characteristics and past experiences. We assume a linear specification:
tfpi,t = β1CEOi,t + β2TMT i,t + β3fvi,t + β4fci +DIndi + Γt + ci + εi,t (2.13)
Firm-level controls include time-variant factors fvit and invariant variables fci.18 Sub-
industry fixed effect is controlled with a set of dummies DIndi.19 Year dummies are not
controlled because they may extract the natural growth of technology from TFP. However,
financial crisis dummy is controlled to extract the effect of firm’s strategical change in reac-
tion to the market shocks, so the remaining part of TFP change is a pure effect of production
capacity growth. We capture the crisis dummy Γt by using 2012 as a cutoff according to
the patterns of inputs/output in production. ci is the unobservable heterogeneity and εit is
the idiosyncratic error.
We first adopt pooled OLS estimation as the baseline because it only requires the
weakest assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity.20 It is performed in a stepwise man-
ner. Before we add CEO or TMT variables into the model, R-square shows that only
around 9.7% of the TFP variation is explained by the firm controls. Column 1-3 in Ta-
ble 2.3 represent regression models where CEO and TMT factors are added. We find that
18 Current TFP depends on firm’s traits at current period and financial condition (ROA / asset structure)
in the previous period. Taking one period lagged financial condition also helps avoid the potential reverse or
simultaneous causality.
19 Manufacturing has 29 categories based on the National Standard of Industry Classification. We manu-
ally re-classify all firms into 10 sub-categories based on similarity to avoid over-control and collinearity. The
details of sub-industry classification are in Appendix A.4, based on the two-digit code of the SIC.
20 Contemporaneous exogeneity only requires the explanatory variables to be independent from the com-
posited error term in the same period, not necessarily in the future or previous periods.
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Table 2.3: Pooled OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect
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CEO’s experiences explain around 8% of the TFP variation. The magnitude of R-square is
almost doubled after controlling both CEO and TMT factors. 18.3% of the TFP variation
is explained, implying that leadership’s human capital plays important role in shifting TFP.
For CEO’s past experiences, length of working experiences significantly raises TFP
by 1.3% for every ten more years in the industry. CEO’s leadership tenure and formal
education have insignificant impacts on TFP with small magnitudes. Overseas and innova-
tion experiences significantly increase TFP by around 3.5% and 1.9% respectively, while
production experience hinders TFP by around 3.6%. Finance/accounting experience has
negative but insignificant effect on TFP, while marketing experience promotes TFP though
this impact is also insignificant. After controlling TMT’s factors, the impacts of above-
mentioned CEO factors are relatively consistent only with marginal changes in magnitudes.
For TMT factors, every 10% more female members promote a firm’s TFP by around
0.8%. Members’ formal education also spurs the actual productivity that TFP increases
by around 0.7% for every 10% more members with a bachelor’s or higher degree. The
length of collaboration, measured by tenure heterogeneity, impedes TFP. Both types of
team diversity, which are age and tenure, significantly reduce TFP. Every 10% increase of
the standard deviation in tenure or age compared to their mean levels reduce TFP by 0.38%
and 0.03%, respectively. The impacts of above TMT factors are robust after controlling
CEO factors, with marginal magnitude change.
The estimates of firm controls are relatively consistent with literature using Chinese
data (Chen and Guariglia, 2013). 10% expansion on firm size reduces TFP by around 0.5%,
but it is insignificant. Every 1% increase of ROA and market share promotes TFP by around
0.5% and 0.1%, respectively. 1% higher liability to asset ratio results in 0.26% lower TFP.
Every 1% more shares hold by TMT members promote TFP by 1%. State ownership has
an ambiguous impact on TFP due to the potential net effect. The firms located at big cities
have 4.0% higher TFP on average compared to those who located at developing regions.
Taking the advantages of panel data, we further adopt the Random Effect (RE) method.
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It helps improve the efficiency at the cost of a much stronger assumption, which is strict
exogeneity. The results are relatively consistent with those in Pooled OLS with marginal
changes in magnitudes (Table 2.3, Column 4). 10 more years of general experience sig-
nificantly promote TFP by 1.3%, while TFP would be reduced by 3.2% for every 10 years
longer leadership tenure. Overseas and innovation experiences significantly increase TFP
by 2.8% and 1.7% respectively, while production experience impedes TFP by 2.1%.
For TMT factors, 10% more female members promote TFP by around 0.9%. Ed-
ucation level is also positively associated with the TFP that 10% more members with a
bachelor’s or higher degree increase TFP by 0.4%. Members’ tenure and age heterogeneity
both impede the productivity to some extent due to the collaboration friction, reducing the
TFP by around 0.02% and 0.2% respectively for every 10% increase, which is statistically
significant. The results of Pooled OLS and Random Effect support each other, telling a
consistent story.
2.6 Endogenous Process of CEO Appointment
Hausman test implies that the endogeneity issue exists. The CEO appointment process
is a matching of CEO’s human capital to firm’s objective conditions and holistic plan.
Therefore, CEO’s characteristics and past experiences are potentially associated with the
unobservable heterogeneity ci. In contrast, though the CEO turnover rate might be higher
after sudden external shocks, due to the time-consuming nature of making and processing
dismission decision, CEO turnover does not happen immediately. Therefore, we assume
CEO factors are independent from idiosyncratic error at current period, which is εit.
In making CEO appointment decision, CEO’s special experiences are more likely to
be considered, while the general experiences are the secondary concern. For instance,
compared to the demographic characteristics or formal education, specific functional ex-
periences gained over one’s career life are highly valued by the decision-makers. Though
CEO’s general working length and education are also considered, they only remotely influ-
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ence the appointment. Therefore, we assume that overseas background and four industrial
functional experiences are endogenous, and working length and education are exogenous.
As to empirical methods, the widely used ways to address the endogeneity with panel
data is the fixed effect (FE) or first differencing (FD). We first do the within estimation by
controlling firm’s fixed effect. Results provide some useful information on the frequently
changing variables (Table 2.3, Column 5). The length of general working experiences and
leadership tenure both have significant impacts on TFP but in opposite directions. For TMT
factors, age diversity negatively influences TFP, while larger proportion of females in TMT
leads to higher TFP. Above CEO and TMT factors all have consistent results with those in
the pooled OLS and RE estimation in terms of directions and magnitudes.
However, the estimates of CEO’s special experiences provided by the within-estimation
are insignificant or even have the opposite signs compared to those in the pooled OLS and
RE. One possible reason is that these experiences, including overseas and four career ex-
periences, are all measured by dummy variables, so they rarely change overtime.21 In this
case, these variables may lack enough within variation after taking time-demean or first-
difference, leading to inefficient or even inconsistent estimates. To provide supplement
results to remedy the potential weakness of within FE, we adopt the alternative methods
of Pooled 2SLS and Random-Effect Instrument Variable (RE-IV) to get rid of doing time-
demean or first-difference.
To implement RE-IV, we first adopt the Hausman-Taylor method to seek instruments
from within the panel system. These internal IV candidates include demeaned time-variant
variables z1 = [ ¨TMT i,t, f̈vi,t], as well as the non-redundant exogenous time-variant vari-
ables at all periods z2 = [TMT i,s, fvi,s] (s 6= t). Although these internal IVs technically
satisfy the IV assumptions, some of them are weak instruments due to remote relation
with CEO assignment. Appointment decision is usually made by the board of directors
after considering firm’s objective conditions, together with the opinions from board of
21 Though we find an upward trending for CEO’s special experiences, the change rate is small. Only when
firm replaces its CEO, these variables have the chance to change, but they are also not necessarily to change.
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shareholders. Therefore, TMT factors are only weakly related to CEO appointment, so
we eliminate TMT-related instruments. Time-demeaned factors, f̈vi,t, imply firm’s tur-
bulence in specific period, which might be the source of CEO turnover.22 Among these
time-demeaned instruments, the fluctuation of financial condition in the short run will not
lead to the change of CEO immediately, but the structural change may indicate the potential
personnel change. In this case, we choose time-demeaned firm size and market share due
to their close association with CEO turnover, so IV 1 = [ ¨fv1i,t, ¨fv3i,t].23.
However, we have five endogenous variables but only two instruments so far, so we
need extra external instruments which are related to CEO’s special experiences. As as-
sumed, CEOs in the same industry, same province and at same year may share similar
experiences, because these companies have similar preference on CEO selection because
of facing similar market, business, local policy, and environment. Therefore, we use the
proportion of CEOs in the same industry, province and year with certain experiences as ex-
ternal IVs, IV 2 = [oi,t, pi,t, fi,t,mi,t, ii,t].
24 These instruments are thus closely associated
with CEO’s specific experience, while independent from the unobserved heterogeneity and
random shocks. We therefore have seven instruments for five endogenous variables:
IV s = [IV 1, IV 2] = [ ¨fv1i,t, ¨fv3i,t, oi,t, pi,t, fi,t, mi,t, ii,t]
The estimation results show that most of CEO factors are still significant in RE-IV
method after improving efficiency (Table 2.4, Column 2 and 3).25 General working length
is positively associated with TFP. 10 more years in the industry lead to 2.3% higher TFP.
Leadership tenure significantly reduces TFP by 3% for every ten more years as a leader in
current firm. This result implies that the negative impact of sluggish management taken
by long-tenured CEO overweighs the positive effect of CEO’s familiarity to operational
22 We drop z2, which are the level of firm factors at all other periods. They are more likely related to firm
factors at current period, so they potentially violate the exclusion assumption, being weak IV.
23 The detailed notation is in Table 2.2
24 oi,t, pi,t, fi,t,mi,t, ii,t are instruments for overseas, production, fin/acc, marketing and innovation ex-
periences, respectively. More details are explained in Appendix A.2.
25 The first-stage regression results are attached in Appendix A.3.
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Table 2.4: Pooled 2SLS, RE-IV and Dynamic Perspective
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condition. CEO education has insignificant impact on TFP. In general, CEOs with higher
degree have broader horizon and stronger managerial skills, promoting operation efficiency
and technology progress. However, these advantages are major-specific. Some education
specialties have positive impacts on TFP, such as science/engineering, while others have
negative or no association, such as legal degree (Barker and Mueller, 2002). Therefore,
there is no significant association at conventional level.26
CEO’s overseas experience significantly facilitates TFP by 11.9% as a potential result
of better perspectives towards innovation and stronger managerial ability. Production or
finance/accounting CEO significantly hinders TFP by 7% and 4.2%, respectively, due to
a dominant effect of lower innovation incentives. Marketing or innovation CEO raises
TFP by around 6.6% and 8.1%, respectively, as the potential result of better perspectives
and more information towards market demand and products, as well as a more flexible
management style. The impact of CEO’s special experiences on TFP is still significant
after controlling for the TMT factors.
For TMT composition, every 10% more female members lead to around 0.9% higher
TFP due to diversified management ideas, smooth communication, and efficient collabo-
ration in the workplace. 10% more well-educated members promote TFP by around 0.4%
due to broader horizon and better perspectives towards operation and strategical design, as
well as stronger management skills. Tenure and age diversity significantly impedes TFP by
0.2% and 1.9% respectively for every unit increase in coefficient of variation. Age diversity
reflects different styles and opinions toward management, boosting managerial vitality by
bringing in new ideas on the one hand, but leading to communication friction on the other.
Smaller tenure diversity reflects longer cooperation length among members, which implies
better coordination and less conflicts but leads to the “sluggish management” with rigid
strategies as the bi-product. For these two diversity variables, although they influence TFP
in both directions, the negative direction seems the dominant one.
26 Barker and Mueller found insignificant association between conventional education level and R&D
spending which is one of the sources of technology progress and thus TFP promotion.
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The results of endogeneity-adjusted estimation are quite consistent with those in the
baseline estimation. Though we find the marginal change in significance and magnitudes,
the directions of the estimates are the same. CEO’s marketing and finance/accounting
experiences become significant, with the same signs and larger magnitudes. One possibility
is that, due to the potential association, the pure impacts of CEO’s experiences are partially
soaked up by the unobserved heterogeneity, losing the explanation power. In all, these two
methods tell a consistent story.
2.7 The Long-run Effect of Managerial Human Capital
We then consider a dynamic specification to see the long-run effect of CEO and TMT’s
human capital. Given the continuity of firm’s operation, TFP at current period may depend
on its past value, showing a state dependence, so we add the one-period lagged TFP into
equation (2.13) to control its persistent trend or serial correlation.27 Moreover, the regres-
sors might also have the lasting effects on TFP. Due to the inclusion of more lagged periods
of independent variables and controls, lagged TFP helps to mitigate the omitted variable
bias at the meantime.28 However, the inclusion of lagged CEO and TMT factors may cause
high level multicollinearity, because they are potentially associated with managerial factors
at current period according to the rarely changing nature. In this case, dynamic specifica-
tion tells us a story of the long-run effect, giving us a supplement of static specification.
The AR(1)-type dynamic model is then constructed as:
tfpi,t = γ · tfpi,t−1 +β1CEOi,t+β2TMT i,t+β3fvi,t+β4fci+DIndi+ Γt+ ci+ εi,t (2.14)
In equation (2.14), tfpi,t−1 is endogenous due to its inclusion of ci. In the firm- or
household- level research, the widely used ways to address this issue is the IV estimation
(or Pooled 2SLS) suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), and the IV-GMM method
27 Based on exiting papers and test results, one-period lag is enough to control the persistent effect.
28 We do not know how many periods of lagged factors have significant effects on TFP. Therefore, we
directly control tfpi,t−1 to include the independent variables and controls in all past periods.
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proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Both methods deal with the association between
firm’s unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous variables by taking first-difference on
equation (2.14) to remove ci, and select appropriate instruments for the new endogenous
variable ∆tfpi,t−1.29 However, a similar issue exists that CEO dummies lack enough within
variation after differencing the original equation. Moreover, the differencing operation also
magnifies the gaps in a case of unbalanced panels.
Arellano and Bover (1995) / Blundell and Bond (1998) thus introduced a system-
GMM method to address this issue. Instead of transforming equation (2.14), they do first-
difference on the instruments, making them exogenous to ci, meaning that using ∆tfpi,t−1
as the IV for tfpi,t−1. It is proved to be a valid IV, because corr (∆tfpi,t−1, tfpi,t−1) 6= 0
and corr (∆tfpi,t−1, vi,t) = 0 (Appendix A.2). However, this method assumes all available
instruments come within the panel system, while the inclusion of external instruments is not
allowed. In our case, though these internal IV satisfy the basic assumptions theoretically,
they might be weak instruments because they are remotely associated with the endogenous
variables.
To overcome these weaknesses, we take an alternative strategy by extending the RE-
IV setup in the last section. To implement, we keep all instruments in the static model,
and inspired by the system-GMM to select one more IV for the extra endogenous variable
tfpi,t−1, which is ∆tfpi,t−1.30 Using this strategy, we not only get consistent estimates, but
also keep a consistent implementation with the static specification. The instruments used
in dynamic model thus are:
IV d = [∆tfpi,t, ¨fv1i,t, ¨fv3i,t, oi,t, pi,t, fi,t, mi,t, ii,t]
Based on the results, TFP in the last year explains a firm’s current productivity to a
large extent with an estimate around 0.33 (Table 2.4, Column 4 and 5). γ̂ < 1 implies that
29 Anderson-Hsiao uses yi,t−2 as an instrument for ∆yi,t−1, while Arellano-Bond further derives all rele-
vant moment conditions to improve the efficiency, using [yi,t−2, yi,t−3, . . . , yi,1] as instruments for ∆yi,t−1.
30 Though even earlier lagged difference can also be IVs, some papers point out that they lead to bias in
finite sample case. Moreover, we need to manually do this estimation at a cost of losing sample size.
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current TFP has a depreciation effect on future TFP level.
After controlling for lagged TFP, the impacts of CEO’s experiences are consistent with
those in the static specification. CEO with ten more years of general working experience
significantly raises TFP by 1.5%, while tenure length insignificant affects TFP due to a
potential offset effect of stronger control power and inertia management. The impact of
CEO’s education is also insignificant after controlling for other experiences. CEO with
overseas, marketing, or innovation experience promotes TFP by around 7.3%, 6.3% and
2.2%, respectively, due to larger operation flexibility and higher innovation motivation.
Production or finance/accounting experience still significantly hinders TFP by 6.7% and
5.8%, respectively.
To see the long-run impacts, CEO with overseas, marketing or innovation experience
leads to an accumulated 10.9%, 9.4%, and 3.3% respectively in a long-run perspective,
compared to those firms whose CEOs do not have these corresponding experiences. In
contrast, CEO with production or finance/accounting experience significantly reduces TFP
by 10% and 8.7% respectively in the long run. The accumulative long-run impacts of these
special experiences are comparable to 1.5 times the magnitudes in a static view.
For TMT factors, every 10% more female members raise TFP by 0.6% due to a
smoother and vital teamwork sourced by diversified ideas and better communication. Mem-
bers’ education has insignificant impact after controlling for other factors. Age diversity
impedes TFP significantly by 0.16%, indicating that the negative impact of operation fric-
tions overweighs the advantages of diversified opinions. Tenure heterogeneity has insignif-
icant impact on TFP due to the interaction between richer human capital pool and opin-
ion/style collision. TMT’s composition also has the long-run impact on TFP that every
10% more female executives increase TFP by 0.9% in the long run, while the accumulative
negative impact of TMT’s age diversity on TFP converges to 0.23%.
Comparing the impacts of CEO and TMT factors in static and dynamic specifications,
only a small number of CEO factors change their significance after controlling the persis-
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tence of TFP trend, such as CEO’s tenure and innovation background. As we mentioned,
besides the finite sample bias, another possible explanation is the multicollinearity. Lagged
TFP is explained by CEO’s experiences at lagged periods. Therefore, if a firm does not
change its CEO across sequential years, lagged TFP should be highly correlated to current
CEO factors to a large extent. Despite this issue, the results in dynamic specification still
have the reference value, not only because they further support the basic results in a static
view, but also provide a broad picture of CEO and TMT’s long-run impacts.
2.8 Sensitivity-test with Detrending Strategy
Due to the panel data nature, all variables have the time-series properties.So far, we
assume the TFP growth is a stationary process, meaning that the TFP level at different years
have the same distribution, and the relationship between tfpi,t and tfpi,s (t 6= s) does not
change across time.31 However, this assumption is too ideal, and usually violated in the
real world cases.
Many economic factors have the growing tendency in time-series. In Section III, we
also find that both TFP level and the proportion of CEOs with certain special experience
have the similar upward trending. So far, we only verify the potential association between
TFP and managerial factors, but cannot tell whether this association is a causal relationship,
or only because they are influenced by the same confounding factors (usually the macroe-
conomic factors), and thus share the similar time-trends.32 Moreover, in the last section,
we find that though the estimated coefficient of tfpi,t−1 is around 0.35, and we cannot rule
out the possibility of unit root based on test result.
To further address this issue, we do a senstivity test by following a traditional method
of time-detrending. Instead of controlling for crisis dummy, we create a time-trend variable
with the value equivalent to the number of year, Trendt, to control the nature linear trend
31 The stationary process implies that TFP at each year has the same data generating process.
32 These confounding factors include but not limit to the internalization, economy growth, etc..
31
of TFP, transforming a trend-stationary process to a stationary time-series.33 Though using
this method can address the problem in time-series dimension, it has the efficiency problem.
Therefore, we use it as a supportive test for the baseline and dynamic specifications. The
setup of time-trend-control specification is as following:
tfpi,t = β1CEOi,t + β2TMT i,t + β3fvi,t + β4fci +DIndi + Trendt + ci + εi,t (2.15)
The result verifies that TFP itself has a nature upward trending, reflected by a positive
significant coefficient for time-trend variable (Table 2.5). After controlling for the nature
time trend, the impacts of managerial human capital are relatively consistent with those
in the baseline model, only having marginal changes in magnitudes. Besides the positive
impact of general working experiences and negative effect of leadership tenure, CEO’s
special experiences still notably influence the TFP promotion. Overseas and innovation ex-
periences promote TFP by around 8% and 5.1%, respectively, while functional experiences
in production and finance/accounting hinder TFP by around 7.9% adnd 6.8%, respectively.
Their impacts on TFP are all significant in both statistical and economical sense, only hav-
ing marginal changes compared to those in the baseline model (10.9%, 7.3%, -6.6% and
-4.8%, respectively).
For TMT factors, age and tenure diversity negatively hinders TFP by 0.21% and 2.1%
for every one unit change in ratio of standard deviation to its mean. Larger proportions of
female and highly-educated executives promote TFP, reflected by the evidence that every
10% more females or highly educated members raise TFP by 0.85% and 0.22%, respec-
tively, which are comparable to 0.91% and 0.27% without controlling the time-trend.
Above results further support the story told by the baseline estimation, partially ver-
ifying that CEO’s experiences and TMT composition have the causal relationship with
TFP. We also find an interesting pattern that, after controlling for the time trend, the posi-
tive impacts of CEO’s overseas experience, innovation background and length of industrial
33 For instance, at year 2008, the value of this variable is 2008. We do not directly control the year fixed
effect, because it potentially leads to overidentification and multicollinearity issue.
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experiences, as well as larger proportions of female and highly-educated TMT members,
are all comparatively smaller than those in the baseline. In contrast, the negative impacts
of CEO’s production experience, finance/accounting background and length of leadership
tenure, as well as two kinds of TMT diversity, are all relatively larger than those in the
baseline. These patterns prove that TFP itself has the nature growth trend as the result
of economic growth, and the association between some ”positive-impact” experiences and
TFP is partially explained by the common trend. The common trends also absorb the partial
negative impacts of some factors that hinder the TFP.
2.9 Heterogeneous Influencing Channels in Sub-industry
The influencing or formation channels of TFP in different types of firms may differ due
to their different structure and production mode. Therefore, we are also interested in inves-
tigating the heterogeneous impacts of managerial human capital in different sub-industries.
In previous sections, all manufacturing firms are classified into ten sub-industries based on
their product and task similarity. However, if we redo estimation for each of these sub-
industries or add interaction terms of each CEO/TMT factor with sub-industry dummies,
the degree of freedom will not be large enough to guarantee consistent results.
Based on the factor-intensive types on production inputs and product property, we
therefore reclassify firms into two categories, tech-intensive and traditional companies. The
former refers to those whose main business is tech-intensive products, such as equipment,
electronic, automobile, machinery, etc. These firms aim at developing innovative products,
which require higher technology in the production (both process and equipment) to support
invention, so focusing more on the technology innovation to achieve higher TFP.
The traditional manufacturing firms have their main business in food, beverage, tex-
tile, lumber raw material processing, and so on. These companies chase higher quality
and larger quantity of production outputs, while pay less attention on new inventions.
Therefore, they focus more on the improvement of production and management process
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to achieve larger TFP via higher efficiency. Based on the descriptive statistics, both cat-
egories have enough samples with comparable numbers of firm-year observations, 5,260
and 5,838 for tech-intensive and traditional firms, respectively.
By doing RE-IV on tech-intensive and traditional firms separately, we find that man-
agerial factors have heterogeneous impacts on them (Table 2.6). Compared with traditional
firms, CEO and TMT play even more important roles in the high-tech companies. Long-
tenured CEO has negative impact on TFP that one more year in the leadership at current
firm reduces TFP by around 0.5%. In both static and dynamic views, overseas CEO signif-
icantly raises TFP by around 19%, much larger than that in the whole samples (7%-10%).
As to the long-run effect, overseas CEO accumulatively raise TFP by 24% . Produc-
tion CEO impedes TFP by 8% in static specification, while has an insignificant impact in
a dynamic view as a potential result of high-level multicollinearity. The impacts of both
finance/accounting and marketing experiences are insignificant, but the magnitudes and di-
rections are comparable to those in the whole samples. Innovation CEO significantly raises
TFP by 13% in dynamic specification, with a long-run effect converges to 16%. In contrast,
with the whole samples, innovation CEO promotes TFP only by around 2%-7%.
For traditional manufacturing firms, we find different patterns on CEO experiences.
In static specification, every 10 more years of general experiences significantly raise TFP
by around 2.3%. The impact of leadership tenure length is insignificant in both static and
dynamic specifications. Overseas CEO still notably increases TFP by around 12%, with
the long-run effect of 14.2%, which are much lower than those of the high-tech firms. For
career experiences in various functions, they all have insignificant impacts on TFP with
much smaller magnitudes compared to high-tech firms, though the signs are the same.
The impacts of TMT composition also tell different stories between these two types
of firms. Age diversity has a positive but insignificant impact in tech-intensive firms, while
impedes TFP significantly in the traditional firms by 0.5% with a long-run effect of 0.6%.
Larger proportion of female members lead to higher TFP in both tech-intensive and tradi-
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tional firms, while the magnitudes are much larger in the high-tech firms. Every 10% more
female executives increase TFP by 1.4% with a long-run effect of 1.7% in the high-tech
firms, while only around 0.4% in the traditional sector. Tenure heterogeneity hinders TFP
in the tech-intensive firms significantly by 4.3% with a long-run effect of 5.2%.
Results above verify our hypothesis that high-tech and traditional manufacturing firms
potentially have different channels to achieve higher productivity. Tech-intensive firms are
more sensitive to their leadership, reflected by the evidence that CEO’s career experiences
in various functions significantly affect TFP, while their impacts in traditional firms are
much weaker and insignificant. To discuss in detail, CEO’s experiences that reflect in-
novation and operation vitality (innovation, overseas, etc.) significantly spur TFP in tech-
intensive sector, while those experiences that hinder firm’s operation vitality and innovation
impede TFP (production, longer tenure, etc.). In contrast, in the traditional manufacturing
sector, CEO experiences that improve production and operation efficiency promote TFP
(general experiences, education, overseas, etc.), while others have weaker impacts. Above
results further support that tech-intensive firms have higher requirement of innovation and
technology on their products, so creativity and vitality are the priority, while improving
process efficiency is the main channel to boost productivity in traditional firms.
2.10 Conclusion
The main goal for the manufacturing firms is to promote input-output conversion rate
in production, measured by total factor productivity. To raise it, two major channels are ef-
ficiency improvement and technology promotion. Both channels are potentially influenced
by leadership to a large extent, due to its neglectable roles in daily operation.
Due to delegation, CEOs play an important role in making decision and leading team-
work. CEOs’ unobservable human capital can be better reflected by their past experiences,
including the experiences in general and in special functions. Besides the widely discussed
factors (length of industrial experiences, education, tenure, etc.), we find that CEO’s over-
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seas, marketing and innovation experiences raise TFP by 5%-10% respectively. These
special experiences imply the creative mindset, advanced skills, and better perspectives
towards market and products, so these CEOs have larger motivation and stronger capac-
ity to pursue innovation and process adjustment. In contrast, CEO with production or fi-
nance/accounting experiences reduces TFP by around 4%-7% respectively with a possible
explanation of lower incentive in innovation.
Top management team mainly plays a supportive duty in the implementation, so mem-
bers’ aggregated human capital and team collaboration both influence TFP. We find that
larger portion of females or well-educated members leads to higher TFP due to the po-
tentially stronger skills in team coordination to improve efficiency. Larger age or tenure
diversity imply diversified styles and opinions towards operation, so they boost creativity
and managerial vitality on the one hand, while lead to larger collaboration frictions on the
other. Our results show that the latter channel is the dominant one in manufacturing sector,
reflecting by the negative impacts.
When separately considering the high-tech firms and traditional companies, the im-
pacts of managerial human capital on them are different. In high-tech firms, CEO’s special
experiences are highly valued, especially those reflecting better sense and skills of inno-
vation, or helping boost management vitality. In contrast, the smoothness of operation to
boost productivity is the priority in traditional manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the gen-
eral experiences in the industry, as well as advanced management skills would contribute
more to promote production efficiency.
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CHAPTER 3
LEADERSHIP’S HUMAN CAPITAL AND CORPORATE R&D INVESTMENT
3.1 Introduction
As we discussed previously, Chinese manufacturing firms suffer from the severe ex-
ternal condition and intense market competition in recent years, requiring higher TFP to
maintain long-run growth. Technology progress is examined as one among the most im-
portant channels to boost TFP. Innovation is one strategy that serves as the engine of tech-
nology progress, helping firms to maintain the sustainability. As the starting point, R&D
investment fosters innovation success, thus playing important role in a firm’s sustainable
development. Therefore, analyzing the influencing factors and mechanisms of R&D inputs
is of great value.
Many papers discuss the R&D decision-making and innovation outcomes in terms of a
company’s objective conditions and inherent traits, including firm age, size, financial con-
dition, external environments, etc. These factors reflect a firm’s operational preference and
unique goals, therefore leading to heterogeneous R&D strategies across firms (Cohen and
Klepper, 1996; Lee and Sung, 2005; Fan and Wang, 2019). Besides basic traits, financial
conditions and operation strategies also affect R&D propensity (Aghion et al., 2012; How-
ell, 2017). The external conditions, such as competition intensity and market demand, also
influence a firm’s incentives to innovate (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975; Acs et al., 1987).
Moreover, the innovative environment and other supports provided by the government are
also negligible, such as the preferable policies, including tax benefits, R&D subsidies and
direct investment (Chen et al., 2018).
These papers leave key questions unexplained: why do firms with similar internal/external
conditions and basic traits still take different R&D strategies? What factors are omitted in
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explaining this heterogeneity? To answer these questions, a series of papers further points
out that the leadership team also influences R&D activities, because it is responsible for
determining the budget plan and adjusting R&D investment in implementation. Existing
research argues that the control power, external stimulus, and managerial incentives are
the bridge to link the leaders’ traits with R&D spending. The agency problem, manage-
rial control power (such as position duality and delegation), and team composition (such
as the proportion of independent directors) all contribute to R&D incentives (Overvest and
Veldman, 2008; Zona, 2016; Lee et al., 2020).
Though managerial factors are widely discussed, only limited number of papers ex-
plore the influencing factors of corporate innovation in the context of managerial human
capital. Demographic characteristics and general experiences are adopted to measure the
managerial human capital. Age, gender, and tenure of the top management team may
all influence R&D investment, explained by the agency theory and upper echelon theory
(Chen et al., 2010). Besides demographic characteristics, general experiences of individ-
ual decision-maker or team composition are also said to make contribution to innovation
propensity, such as that education level, tenure board size, and board meeting frequency
(Ann and Minshall, 2012; Chen, 2013).
Some papers also discuss the corporate decision-making from the angle of managerial
human capital. Innovative human capital is explained or formed by the formal education,
training, willingness to change, and job satisfaction (McGuirk et al., 2015). Relevant top-
ics are also discussed in Chinese context, examining that a firm’s general and managerial
human capital both affect its innovation outcome in manufacturing sector (Sun et al., 2020).
Besides the basic traits and general experiences, some novel measures are also dis-
cussed. CEO’s education in some specific fields, such as advanced science or engineering,
and some special functional experiences (marketing, finance, technical, etc.), as well as
the industrial interlock, all have a prolong impact on R&D incentives (Barker and Mueller,
2002; Dalziel et al., 2011). R&D incentives and performance are also positively influenced
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by the past management and government experiences (Lin et.al, 2011). Independent di-
rectors’ past CEO experience in the same industry contributes to firm’s value-added via
the channel of innovation, while their CEO experience or same industry background itself
does not have the significant impacts (Kang et al., 2018). Measured by the option-stock
execute behavior and press-based indicator, firms led by overconfident CEOs not only have
more vibrant R&D activities but also perform better in innovation (Malmendier and Tate,
2005&2008; Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012).
This topic especially has the practical implications for the Chinese manufacturing in-
dustry. Facing the pressure of rapidly growing production costs in recent years, Chinese
manufacturing firms and governments at various levels are focusing heavily on innovation.
For instance, the R&D expenditure of China has ranked second in the world since 2013.1
Enterprises are the main impetus for R&D investment, contributing to 68.5% of the overall
R&D growth. Therefore, China’s practice of promoting innovation provides useful infor-
mation for studying R&D behavior at the firm level (Howell, 2016; Che et al., 2018; Chen
et al., 2018).
3.2 Theoretical Framework
Based on Crépon, Duguet, and Mairessec (1998), the innovation process consists of
several iterative and incremental stages, including R&D inputs, innovation outcomes, and
productivity.2 In this paper, we focus on the input stage because the R&D investment
decision is directly determined by the executive leadership.
We first construct a theoretical framework by referring to the model proposed by
Campbell et al. (2011). We assume the executive leadership aims to maximize profits
under the perfect market competition assumption.3 Therefore, firms can only adjust their
1 This and following data come from the R&D Investment Report of National Bureau of Statistics.
2 In the original model, the innovation process consists of four stages. Many subsequent papers point out
that “whether to invest” and “how much to invest” are always decided simultaneously and could be combined.
3 The average market share of the sampled manufacturing firms is quite small. It implies that firms do
not have enough power to influence market price, so we assume a perfect competition.
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production outputs and costs to enlarge the profit via the potential channel of innovation.
The profit maximization problem can be constructed as follows:
max Π = E[π]





Firm’s actual end-of-term profit π is unobserved at the time of making the R&D de-
cision. Therefore, executives’ goal is to maximize the anticipated profits E[π]. f(Ã, I,X)
is the perceived profit that measures the predicted return. It counts all production costs
other than R&D spending. I refers to the money amount planned to be invested in R&D
activities, where I ∈ (0,+∞).
We further express the perceived profit as:
f(Ã, I,X) = Ã g(I,X, ε̃) (3.2)
g(I,X, ε̃) is the actual return depending on firm’s current conditions.4 Without losing of
generality, we assume g(.) is a concave function with a diminishing return to the R&D
input I , indicating that g′(I) > 0, g′′(I) < 0 and limI→0g′(I) = +∞. g(.) also depends on
a set of controlsX , including the quantity and quality of factor inputs, internal and external
conditions, etc. The unpredictable external shock ε̃ also influences the actual profits with
E(ε̃|X, I) = 0.
Another component of the predicted return is a perceived parameter Ã, which deviates
predicted profit from its actual value. It captures leadership’s perception of the profits
gained from R&D, which is non-negative (Ã > 0).5 For the same level of R&D inputs I , a
larger Ã means a higher perceived value evaluated by the leadership. Therefore, we further
4 R&D improves production performance through both costs reducing (process innovation) and product
creation (product innovation). These two channels cannot be distinguished in most cases. By viewing g(.) as
an aggregated effects of R&D on production, we do not take pains to identify the effect via each channel.
5 We assume Ã > 0 because the worst case scenario is to gain nothing. In this case, the firm attempts to
avoid investing in R&D. The assumption Ã > 0 rules out negative production expectation. We further assume
Ã > 1 means leadership overestimates the gain from innovation, while 0 < Ã < 1 means underestimation.
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assume that the magnitude of Ã depends on leadership’s “innovative human capital” H:
Ã = Ã(H) (3.3)
To derive the optimal R&D investment level I∗, we take the first order condition with




On rearranging the above partial differential equation, we get the optimal level of R&D






Based on the above analysis, leadership’s managerial human capital influences a firm’s
R&D investment via perceived return. As we mentioned, a key problem is that manage-
rial human capital H is unobserved. To measure the managerial human capital related
to R&D propensity, we construct a similar framework from the last chapter. Borrow the
same concept, an individual’s human capital accumulated via inherent factors, formal edu-
cation, and learning-by-doing over the lifetime. Among these channels, learning-by-doing
is highly valued when leadership is appointed, and it also plays a crucial role in forming
the vision of innovation. It is formed via different occupations, job tasks and some special
experiences. Therefore, we express an individual’s human capital as:6
hct = f(ot, wt, st, et, xt) (3.6)
As to whose human capital matters, we consider it from the angle of R&D decision-
making process. The actual R&D investment is guided by R&D budget plan, which is
6 The notations in the following expression is defined the same as in the last chapter.
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usually proposed by CEO and approved by BOD at the end-of-year board meeting. Besides
that, R&D adjustments in the implementation are also determined by CEO and BOD, such
as follow-on or stop-loss strategy. Therefore, CEO and the collection of BOD’s experiences
help to widen a firm’s managerial human capital spectrum, so it can be expressed as:
H = H(CEO,BOD) (3.7)
CEO = hcceot is CEO’s personal human capital. BOD = hc
bod
t is the aggregated human
capital of BOD, which is a collection of each director’s human capital.
To sum up, our hypothesis is that CEO and BOD’s human capital, especially gained
from the learning-by-doing, would influence firm’s R&D decision with the potential chan-
nel of perceived profits towards the firm. These human capital factors can be reflected or
measured by some special experiences. In the next section, we discuss which kinds of ex-
periences of CEO and directors play important roles in R&D decision-making, as well as
their influencing mechanism.
3.3 Data Resources and Variable Selection
We use the same database as in the last chapter, China Stock Market and Accounting
Research Database (CSMAR). Our original samples are also the same as before, including
all manufacturing firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China,
covering the period 2008 to 2016.
Due to the panel data structure in this specific case, we first drop the samples that only
have one year of record in the database. They would be dropped automatically in estimation
due to the missing values on lagged firm controls. We also drop the samples that only have
two years of records because we use the second-lagged firm controls as the IV to address
endogeneity. Finally, we drop the samples of the year 2008 because less than 25% of the
firms (208 firms) report their R&D expenditure that year. After this process, we have an
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unbalanced panel with 11,257 firm-year observations for 1,593 firms.
Within this unbalanced panel, around 59% of the firms (941 firms) remained in the
stock market for the entire sample period (Panel A, Appendix B.1). As for the yearly entry
and delisting patterns, 741 firms entered the stock market during 2009-2014, while only
11 firms were delisted (Panel B, Appendix B.1). The year 2010-2011 has an “IPO peak”
with more than 400 newly listed manufacturing firms. However, due to a new round of
IPO regulation conducted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the number of
newly-listed firms suddenly dropped after 2012.
This unbalanced panel structure may cause selectivity. The newly-listed and delisted
firms may take different operational strategies during the first several years after entry or the
last several years before delisting. The newly-listed firms are well-prepared to meet the IPO
requirement before entry; here, we assume they take similar strategies and have comparable
performance as other existing firms. Therefore, they are less likely to cause selectivity
issues. In contrast, the delisted firms may cause selectivity due to poor performance and
survival operations during the ST (special treatment) stage. However, due to the small
number of delisted firms, the impact of selectivity should not be large.
3.3.1 Measures of CEO and BOD’s Human Capital
As mentioned, CEO plays an important role in proposing R&D budget plan and im-
plementing the actual investment, so CEO’s human capital should be considered. The
education level not only reflects one’s knowledge reserve but also implies the inherent
intelligence and learning ability (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Wally and Baum, 1994). The well-
educated CEO is more sensitive to new information, integrating it comprehensively and
efficiently (Barker and Mueller, 2002) and reacting to it quickly and properly (Escriba-
Esteve et al., 2009; Wincent et al., 2010), thus they are more capable of identifying market
threats and opportunities. Finally, well-educated CEO has a better perspective and thus
higher risk-tolerance towards high-risk high-return strategies. Therefore, they hold an opti-
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mistic and receptive attitude towards innovation activities (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981).
With overseas experience, CEO gets more exposure to different modes of education,
ways of social interaction, and patterns of corporate operation from abroad. Therefore, they
have better learnability and flexibility to absorb and integrate the new information (Kedia
and Mukherji, 1999). Moreover, the overseas CEO may have a deeper understanding of
and better perspective toward new technology, thus valuing more highly the importance of
innovation (Herrmann and Datta, 2002). Finally, getting access to foreign markets may also
imply richer cognitive skills and external resources (Roth, 1995; Carpenter et al., 2001;
Slater et al., 2009). However, overseas CEO prefers to promote technology in the cost-
effective ways, such as utilizing innovation spillovers or purchasing existing techniques,
rather than the risky R&D activities.
Existing papers provide empirical evidence that past career experiences in various
functions have distinct impacts on R&D investment. Based on the upper echelon the-
ory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), a CEO with the out-
put experiences (marketing, innovation, etc.) aims at promoting corporate development
through market expansion and new product discovery. Therefore, they view R&D as an
irreplaceable approach to achieve sustainable growth. In this context, a CEO with innova-
tion background is more sensitive to innovation activity. Innovative CEO also possesses
sophisticated skills in R&D management and thus are more capable of and confident about
selecting appropriate projects, and guiding R&D activities in practice.
In contrast, throughput experiences (finance, administration, production, law, etc.)
emphasize the importance of operational efficiency in a firm’s long-run growth. A CEO
with the throughput experience views innovation as one among many methods to improve
efficiency, and believe that it can be easily replaced by other cost-efficient and less risky
strategies. In this context, a CEO with production experience may promote performance
through process improvement, therefore tending to allocate more available resources on
process adjustment. CEO’s finance background may have dichotomous impacts on R&D
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activities (Güner et al., 2008). Though a finance CEO may possess more financial re-
sources, he/she may prefer to utilize them in financial strategies to gain acceptable profits
rather than taking the high-risk R&D activities, because he/she has richer knowledge and
stronger abilities in managing the firm’s capital.
Many basic demographic characteristics also influence a CEO’s expectation of R&D.
An older CEO is more experienced to overcome the potential failure but becomes more
risk-averse in general as age increases. A male CEO is more risk-tolerant in general when
face uncertainty. However, these basic characteristics (age and gender) are highly collinear
with the above-mentioned experience-based factors, so we drop them in the estimation.
Based on the descriptive statistics, around 83%-86% of the CEOs hold a bachelor’s
or higher degree with a gradually increasing trend during 2009-2016 (Table 3.1, Panel A).
The proportion of overseas CEOs increases from 4.3% in 2009 to 8.9% in 2016. The pro-
portion of CEOs with production experience increases steadily before 2014 and decreases
after. In contrast, the proportion of CEOs with finance or innovation experiences increases
drastically from 3.6% to 11.1%, and from 19.8% to 29.2% during the sample period, imply
the growing attentions on CEO’s industrial experiences in various functions.
As to BOD’s experiences, we first consider the government background. It includes
current position and previous experience. Public sector employees, especially the govern-
ment employees, are generally more risk-averse due to the nature of job tasks (Buurman
et al., 2012; Nicholson et al., 2019). Moreover, directors with government experience
are assumed to be less creative with weaker industrial management skills due to a more
bureaucratic career background (Lin et al., 2011). Further, current government employ-
ees potentially have broader political connections compared to ex-government employees.
Therefore, they possibly have more external resources, including funding supports, innova-
tion experts and legal insider information (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008).
This resource advantage reduces the actual R&D risk, leading to an optimistic expectation
towards the potential returns.
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Table 3.1: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of CEO and BOD Factors
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Directors with marketing background face various clients and a rapidly changing mar-
ket. Therefore, they have better perspectives towards the products, market, and competi-
tors, thus valuing the technology innovation in the market competition. Moreover, directors
with marketing experience view innovation as one of the irreplaceable methods to discover
new products and expand the market, supporting the firm’s long-run growth. Finally, mar-
keting directors potentially possess richer resources due to broader business cooperation
and social network. These available resources (financial supports and human capital) raise
directors’ risk tolerance level towards R&D uncertainty.
Well-educated directors have similar influencing mechanisms as the highly educated
CEO, including better perspectives and stronger sensitivity toward R&D. Following the
same logic as for CEO’s general characteristics, we drop other basic characteristics and
general experiences, because they are potentially collinear with the experience-specific hu-
man capital factors mentioned above.
Unlike the CEO experience measures with dummy variables, we lack a direct mea-
sure of BOD factors, but have detailed information on each director. Therefore, we use the
proportion of members with a certain experience to measure BOD background.7 Based on
the descriptive statistics (Table 3.1, Panel B), 82%-88% of directors hold a bachelor’s or
higher degree with a steadily increasing trend. The proportion of directors with marketing
experience increases gradually from 8.6% at 2009 to 17.7% at 2016. The proportion of
directors with a current government position remains stable before 2011 but drops from
9.7% to 6.6% since then. With the same pattern, the proportion of directors with previ-
ous government experience plunges from 14.9% to 8.5% after 2011. One possible reason
is government regulation aimed at avoiding potential corruption and insider information
leakage that limits the participation of government employees in the industry.
7 According to the Company Law of P.R.C., each board member has equal voting power, and the pro-
posals shall pass only when more than half of the members entitled to vote in favor (Article 48, Article 111).
In this sense, “whether more than half of the board members possessing certain experience” seems to be a
reasonable cutoff. However, even though the minority does not directly determine the final decision, they still
have the influencing power through suggestion. Therefore, we adopt “the proportion of BOD with certain
experience” to measure BOD’s experiences.
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3.3.2 R&D Intensity and Firm-level Controls
For the dependent variable of R&D input intensity, widely used indicators include the
R&D expenditure to total asset ratio and the R&D expenditure to sales ratio. In general, the
volume of total assets is more stable because it is less likely to be influenced by external
shocks. Therefore, we adopt the R&D to total assets ratio as the measure to better reflect
the internal R&D incentive (Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Sunder et al., 2017; Shaikh et al.,
2018). Based on descriptive statistics (Table 3.2), the R&D to asset ratio is around 2.2%
across years without a clear trend.
Table 3.2: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of R&D Ratio and Firm-level Controls
To see the patterns of the sub-sample, state-owned firms have a 9.3% lower R&D in-
tensity than the private firms. Tech-intensive firms, such as the high-tech, machinery, and
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transportation enterprises, have a larger R&D ratio compared to the traditional manufactur-
ing firms (Appendix B.2). R&D ratio in both sub-sectors are relatively stable without clear
time trend. Geographically, firms located in the eastern region of China have the highest
R&D ratio of 2.2%-2.4%, followed by the firms in the central region with 2.0%-2.1%. The
firms located in the northeastern and western regions has the lowest average R&D ratio
below 1.8%.8 More specifically, manufacturing firms located in developed region (Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangdong) have an average R&D ratio of around 2.3% to 2.6%, signifi-
cantly higher than that of 1.9 to 2.1% in other developing provinces.
For firm-level controls, larger firms may have a higher risk capacity for R&D failure
due to physical, financial, and human capital resource abundance (Fisher and Temin, 1973;
Kamien and Schwartz, 1975). Large firms are also more productive in innovation due to the
economies of scale, specialization, and lower entry barriers.9 Firms with stronger market
share have the advantages of gathering and integrating available resources, further support-
ing R&D activities.10 However, firms with larger market share face fewer threats from the
competitors, and thus focus more on smooth operation and efficiency improvements instead
of radical changes (Hansen and Hill, 1991).
Firm’s profitability and financial constraints measure the funding accessibility and fi-
nancial liquidity. More profitable and less financially restricted firms possess sufficient
financial supports to pursue R&D projects and face the potential failure risk, so they have
higher incentives to pursue innovation (Long and Ravenscraft, 1993). However, poor prof-
itability may motivate the firms to make radical changes to maintain long-run growth (Hitt
et al., 1991). In this paper, we adopt the return to asset ratio (ROA) and the liabilities to
asset ratio as the measures of profitability and financial constraints, keeping the consistent
8 (1) Eastern: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hebei, Zhejiang, Hainan and
Fujian Province; (2) Central: Anhui, Shanxi, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan Province; (3) Northeastern:
Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang Province. All other provinces are defined as part of the western region.
9 Sales and profits are directly influenced by outside market conditions, with quick reactions and drastic
fluctuation. Therefore, they may lead to endogeneity sourced by the omitted external condition variables.
Therefore, we adopt the number of employees as a stable measure of firm size.
10 Since the direct measure for market share or the total market capacity is unavailable, we adopt the
“above designed sized firms” as the proxy for total market sales. See Table 3.2 for details.
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scaling method with the dependent variable.
For the ownership structure, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more financial and
other supports from the government. SOEs also attract more resources due to their high
reputation, such as skilled experts. However, SOEs have lower operation efficiency or
flexibility due to hierarchical structure under government controls. Moreover, SOEs lack
the incentives to make radical changes due to comparative advantages in market competi-
tion. For the geographical location, the industrial clusters in the big cities promote R&D
activities due to the stronger scale effect, larger technology spillovers, lower transmission
costs, and potential R&D cooperation. Moreover, the innovative environment and resource
accessibility in big cities may also encourage innovation efforts.
Based on the descriptive statistics, firm size measured by the number of employees in-
creased gradually during 2008-2015 (Table 3.2). ROA fluctuated between 1.8% and 6.5%,
and the liabilities to assets ratio has a downward trend from 63.9% to 40.9%. The average
market share is small in both magnitude and variation across firms. The proportion of SOEs
decreases drastically from 51.3% to 29.0%, indicating that more private firms entered the
A-share market in recent years due to market liberalization. Finally, the proportion of firms
located in developed regions also increased slightly from 23.8% to 26.9%.
3.4 Baseline Specification
Based on the discussion in the theoretical framework, we construct the baseline model:
RDi,t = β1CEOi,t+β2BODi,t +β3fci +β4fvi,t−1 +DIndi +DY eart + ci + εi,t (3.8)
where RDi,t is the R&D to total asset ratio of firm i at year t. CEOi,t and BODi,t are vec-
tors of human capital factors for CEO and BOD at the current period. Firm-level controls
are categorized into time-variant and time-invariant groups. The time-invariant controls fci
include ownership status and geographic location. The time-variant firm controls fvi,t−1
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include firm size, profitability, financial constraints, and market share, with a one-period
lag.11 ci is the firm’s unobserved fixed effects, and εi,t is the idiosyncratic error. We also
control the year and sub-industry heterogeneity by adding two groups of dummies,DY eart
and DIndi.
We first adopt pooled OLS estimation because it only requires the weakest contem-
poraneous exogeneity assumption. Based on the results, CEO with a bachelor’s or higher
degree raises R&D inputs, while this positive association becomes insignificant after con-
trolling BOD’s experiences (Table 3.3, Column 1 and 2). The collinearity between CEO
education and BOD factors might be the explanation. An overseas CEO leads to a lower
R&D ratio, but it is both statistically and economically insignificant regardless of con-
trolling for BOD factors or not. CEO’s production and finance experience hinder R&D
percentage ratio significantly by 0.22 and 0.27 respectively, while the innovation back-
ground increases R&D ratio in percentage by 0.24. These impacts are still significant after
controlling for BOD factors, only with marginal magnitude changes.
For BOD’s experiences, a highly-educated BOD promotes R&D inputs significantly.
A 10% increase in directors with a bachelor’s or higher degree increases R&D ratio by 0.11,
equivalent to 5.8% of its average level. BOD’s marketing experience also has a significant
positive impact that every 10% more members with the marketing experience lead to a 0.04
higher R&D ratio in percentage. The proportion of directors with previous government
background has a significant negative impact on R&D incentives, whereas the impact of
current government position is insignificant.
As to firm controls, the results are consistent with those in the previous literature.
Firm size and profitability are positively associated with R&D inputs. Every 1% expansion
of firm size leads to a 0.2 larger R&D percent ratio. Firms with larger market power or
financial restriction have a significantly lower R&D intensity compared to others. SOEs
11 Reasons to take a one-period lag: (1) Primary reason: doing so helps to avoid the potential endogeneity
caused by simultaneous or reverse causality; (2) also, when making R&D decision, CEO/BOD refer to firm’s
conditions at the end of previous year rather than the unobservable one at the end of current period.
53
Table 3.3: Pooled OLS and Random Effect
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have a 0.27 lower R&D percent ratio compared to private firms. Finally, firms located
in the developed regions tend to invest more in R&D compared to those located in the
developing cities or towns.
Taking advantage of the panel data structure, we further adopt the random effect (RE)
to improve the efficiency. Based on the results (Table 3.3, Column 3 and 4), a highly-
educated CEO leads to a significantly higher R&D ratio whether control for BOD experi-
ences or not. CEO’s throughput functional experiences are still negatively related to R&D
investment, but the impact of production experience becomes insignificant. An innovative
CEO still raises the R&D investments. Directors’ formal education and marketing expe-
riences spur the R&D ratio by 1.8% and 1.7% respectively for every 10% more members
with these corresponding experiences. Directors’ previous government experience hinders
R&D incentives, though it is insignificant, while directors’ current government position has
a positive impact.
The potential explanation for the differences between pooled OLS and RE estimation
is that pooled OLS ignores the variance-covariance structure of the composited error term.
RE method improves the efficiency at the cost of a stronger strict exogeneity assumption,
which is less likely the case. Therefore, by using pooled OLS and RE as the complement
for each other, we can see a relatively consistent story and broad picture of the influencing
direction and significance of the managerial human capital factors.
3.5 Endogenous Process of CEO Appointment
Above baseline estimation has shown the strong impact of human capital character-
istics of corporate leadership on R&D investment. In this section, we further investigate
and address the potential endogeneity issue of some human capital features. It is likely
that CEO’s appointment and renewal process might depend on a firm’s goals and plans,
including the innovation. We assume that CEO’s experiences are associated with the unob-
servable heterogeneity ci in equation (3.8).
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For publicly listed firms, BOD is usually composed of the largest shareholders, share-
holders’ representatives and selected agents. Most directors may have close social relation-
ship with the shareholders due to the subjective and exclusive nature of BOD appointment
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, BOD experiences may be closely related to share-
holders’ control power and preference, while weakly related to firm-specific determinants
(Li, 1994; Denis, 1999). Existing literature also supports this weak relationship by pro-
viding test-based evidences, so we assume BOD factors are exogeneous (Kor, 2006; Bravo
and Alvarado, 2017).
The actual amount of R&D investment is usually proposed by CEO and approved by
BOD at the end-of-year board meeting, largely depending on firm’s condition at that time
point. Therefore, one-period lagged firm controls have strong deterministic power on R&D
decision. As mentioned, adopting lagged controls avoids potential endogeneity issue in
large extent. Random shocks in the current or future periods will not influence firm’s finan-
cial condition or other traits in the previous period, so E(fv′i,t−1εi,t) = 0, largely reducing
omitted variable bias. Moreover, lagged controls also help to avoid reverse or simultaneous
causality, since firm’s conditions in the previous year will influence the decision on current
R&D inputs, but not the other way around.12 In this case, we assume both BOD factors and
lagged controls are independent from the external shock εi,t, and remotely related to firm’s
fixed heterogeneity.13
The widely used way to address the endogeneity with panel structure is the Fixed
Effect (FE). However, endogenous CEO factors change rarely over time due to the nature of
dummy variables. The descriptive statistics also provide evidence in support of the almost-
invariant assumption on CEO factors, that the within-variation of each CEO factor is only
around 10%-20% during 2009-2016, even though CEO turnover rate is high (Appendix
B.3).14 Therefore, CEO variables may lose within-variation after doing time-demean or
12 Financial status in current year maybe influenced by R&D investment in the same period.
13 The potential endogeneity of firm controls and BOD factors are much weaker compared to that of CEO
factors. Therefore, if any, we simply ignore it.
14 CEO’s factors change only when CEO turnover occurs, or a small number of CEOs gain new experi-
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first-difference, so FE and FD methods are not applicable in our specific case.
Random Effect - Instrument Variable approach (RE-IV) is therefore adopted. Instead
of seeking external instruments, we select IV candidates from within the panel system
based on the Hausman-Taylor method (HT). HT provides two groups of internal IV candi-
dates: (a) the time-demeaned time-variant variables, no matter endogenous or exogeneous,
z1 = [ ¨BODi,t, f̈vi,t−1];
15 (b) time-variant exogenous variables in all periods that are not
redundant, z2 = [BOD0i,s , fv
0
i,s−1 ](s = 1, . . . , T and s 6= t).16 Besides satisfying the IV
assumptions, these two sets of internal IV also make sense in terms of mechanism, because
CEO selection is decided by BOD or owners based on their concerns on whether candi-
dates fit the objective condition. Moreover, BOD appointment may also be influenced by
the CEO factors due to a bargaining process (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Thus, instru-
ments that related to firm characteristics and BOD experiences should be correlated with
the endogenous CEO variables.
However, the large number of potential IV candidates may lead to substantial finite
sample bias due to overidentification, so we only choose a subset of candidates which are
most relevant to CEO appointment.17 CEO’s assignment decision is closely related to firm’s
condition and BOD factors at the most recent, while these factors at other periods have the
relatively remoter impacts. First, CEO appointment or turnover decision is usually made by
BOD at last year due to bargaining process, so current CEO factors should be highly-related
to BOD factors in last period (Tian et al., 2011). Moreover, whether a CEO candidate fits
firm’s objective conditions at the time of making the turnover or appointment decision is
the most important concern, so the latest firm conditions are also the convincing IV. In this
case, we only keep the first-lagged BOD factors and the second-lagged firm controls in z2.
ences. Even if CEO turnover occurs, the experiences may not change between the predecessor and successor.
15 Any director change may lead to the change of each BOD factor. Moreover, outside directors are likely
to gain new experiences. Therefore, we assume BOD factors are time-variant. The statistics also support that
around 80-90% of the firms have a change of each BOD factor during 2009-2016.
16 The superscript “0” in BOD0i,s and fv
0
i,s−1 means the non-redundant variables at period s and s− 1.
17 Assuming the number of variables in CEO, BOD, fc and fv are N1, N2, N3 and N4 respectively,
and the number of time periods is T . We have (N2 +N4) internal IV candidates in the first group and
(T − 1)× (N2 +N4) in the second, thus totally have T × (N2 +N4) = 64 from within the panel system.
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In z1, we keep most of ¨BODi,t due to BOD’s duty in CEO appointment. ¨BODi,t
indicates the potential personnel change on BOD, leading to a preference change on CEO
turnover, so it may be associated with CEO factors.18 However, the short-run turbulent
factors at firm-level (profitability, financial and market condition) might not lead to the
immediate actions on CEO turnover due to high costs, though they may have the long-run
effect.19 In contrast, the structural conditions, such as firm size, are the main concerns
when BOD assigns or change the CEO. Therefore, we only keep the time-demeaned firm
size as the instruments. Finally, we have a comparable number of IV:20
IV =
[
fv1i,t−2, ¨fv1i,t−1, b1i,t−1, b2i,t−1, b3i,t−1, b4i,t−1, b̈1i,t, b̈3i,t, b̈4i,t
]
These IV candidates are assumed to follow the exclusion restriction assumption. They
do not have the direct impacts on R&D investment, because the impacts of BOD and firm
controls at previous periods on current R&D expense are relatively remote. However, they
still influence R&D inputs indirectly through the potential channel of CEO appointment.
Based on the results (Table 3.4), after addressing the endogeneity, highly educated
CEO has an insignificant impact on R&D strategy regardless of controlling BOD factors or
not. One potential reason is that the theoretical knowledge acquired from education is less
important than the practical skills gained via learning-by-doing. Moreover, CEO education
is potentially correlated to other factors controlled in the model, so its impact is partially
absorbed and thus becomes insignificant.21
CEO’s overseas experience also has an insignificant impact on the R&D investment.
First, the net effect of both the positive and negative impacts might be the reason. The better
perspectives towards innovation, higher risk-tolerance and richer resources all contribute to
the positive impact, while the negative impact may come from the market adaptability. Sec-
18 We ignore the time-demeaned BOD previous government experience, because it has small within-
variation and is remotely related to CEO appointment.
19 Some evidences are found in corporate case studies and interview reports in China.
20 The notation of each variable is given in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. Detailed explanation of RE-IV
methods, including instrument selection and assumptions are in Appendix B.4.
21 When we regress CEO education dummies on all other variables, the R2 gives a 0.3 value.
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Table 3.4: Pooled 2SLS and RE-IV (Hausman-Taylor)
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ond, some CEOs only take overseas positions nominally without substantive work, so they
are hard to be distinguished from those without overseas experience. Finally, the “learning
adjustment” may affect the effectiveness of overseas experiences. Short-term overseas ed-
ucation or employment may have marginal impacts on human capital accumulation due to
the time-consuming nature of adjusting to new environment.
Among CEO’s industrial experiences, two throughput backgrounds (finance and pro-
duction) still have negative and significant impacts on R&D inputs. They reduce the R&D
ratio in percent by 2.6, equivalent to 36.4% of its average level. Innovative CEO signifi-
cantly raises R&D ratio in percent by 1.8, equivalent to 81.8% of the average ratio. The
above empirical results support the upper echelon theory that CEOs with throughput func-
tional experiences view R&D activities as one of many alternative methods to improve
efficiency. In contrast, CEOs with output experiences value the importance of R&D in
long-run development. The results also point out that the practical experiences gained from
“learning-by-doing” have more practical value in devising R&D strategy.
For BOD’s factors, every 10% more highly-educated directors lead to 0.13 higher
R&D ratio, equivalent to 5.9% of its average level. The possible explanations are similar
to those of the well-educated CEO, including broader horizon on innovation and stronger
managerial skills. Marketing experience promotes R&D inputs via the potential channels
of better perspectives and sensitivity to the market, products, and firm operations. It is
supported by the evidence that every 10% more members with marketing experience sig-
nificantly raise R&D ratio by 0.07, equivalent to around 3% of its average level.
Previous government experience is negatively correlated with R&D incentives due to
the risk averse attitude. With 10% more directors who previously worked in government
sector, R&D ratio significantly drops 0.02 to 0.06, equivalent to 1%-2.7% of its average
level. In contrast, directors’ current government positions have an insignificant impact
with the potential explanation of the net effect. Richer human capital resources, stronger
financial supports, and legal insider information may incentivize a firm to pursue R&D
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activities, which potentially offset the negative impact caused by the risk aversion attitude
of government employees.
Comparing the results of the baseline model and endogeneity-adjusted estimation, the
latter have larger magnitudes in general, especially the CEO’s factors. These results support
our hypothesis that the CEO’s experiences are endogenous. In the baseline estimation, the
impacts of CEO’s experiences may be partially absorbed by the unobserved heterogeneity.
This difference in the results is particularly evident in the CEO’s functional experience,
which further emphasizes the importance of industrial experiences on a firm’s strategical
decision-making.
3.6 The Long-run Impact of Managerial Human Capital
R&D investment may be affected by its past values (Zona, 2016; Shaikh et al., 2018).
For example, a large investment in previous year may cause more follow-on investments
or less spending in current year depending on the nature and progress of these projects.
Moreover, the human capital variables and firm controls may have lasting impact on R&D.
For instance, the profitability in the last several years may all contribute to the current
R&D inputs. Therefore, inclusion of lagged R&D can capture these effects and mitigate
the potential omitted variable bias.
We adopt AR(1)-type of specification to capture the dynamics of R&D investment:22
RDi,t=γ ·RDi,t−1+β1CEOi,t+β2BODi,t+β3fci+β4fvi,t−1+DIndi+DY eart+ci+εi,t (3.9)
In general, it is common to adopt IV or GMM methods, such as the Arellano-Bond
approach, to estimate a dynamic panel model, addressing endogeneity caused by the corre-
lation between ci and RDi,t−1 (and also CEOi,t).23 These approaches build upon the first
22 Based on the empirical evidence from the previous literature, we assume the autocorrelation dies out
quickly and that AR(1) is enough to capture the past R&D investment information.
23 These methods include but are not limited to Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond, Arellano-Bover and
Blundell-Bond. Current R&D input is irrelevant to the future shocks, so E(RD′i,t−1εi,t) = 0, though it
might be related to current or previous shocks. Furthermore, it should be associated with the unobservable
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differencing of equation (3.9), which aim to remove ci and then find appropriate IV for
∆RDi,t−1. However, due to the rarely-changing nature of CEO’s experiences, taking FD
may significantly reduce the within-variation and therefore lead to inconsistent estimates.24
To address this issue, we take a similar strategy used in the last chapter. We expand
the HT-type of RE-IV in the static model, applying it on level-equation (3.9) instead of
taking first-difference on it. The only difference between the dynamic and static model is
the endogenous term RDi,t−1. Therefore, in the implementation, we only add one more
IV for RDi,t−1, which is ∆RDi,t−1, and keep all existing IV from the static model.25 The
advantages include: (a) it provides consistent estimates under rarely-changing assumption
for the independent variables; (b) the interpretations are comparable to those in the static
models due to a consistent estimation strategy.
Based on the results (Table 3.5), lagged R&D investment has a significantly positive
impact on current R&D inputs with an estimate of 0.4-0.5. This relationship supports our
above-mentioned hypothesis that a firm makes its current R&D investment decision by
referring to its past value, and a consistent R&D strategy is preferred. The estimated coef-
ficient for lagged R&D ratio is less than one, implying a stationary process that the impact
of past R&D investment converges to zero in the far future. From a dynamic perspective,
CEO and BOD’s human capital also has an accumulated lasting impact on R&D strategy
through the lagged R&D in the long-run.
CEO with a bachelor’s or higher degree has an insignificant impact on R&D invest-
ment regardless of controlling for BOD’s factors or not. Overseas CEO leads to a 1.4 higher
R&D ratio, equivalent to 64% of its average level. Overseas CEO may have stronger cog-
nitive skills, better perspectives, and broader horizons, so he/she is more sensitive to a
firm’s current condition and actively adjust R&D strategies accordingly. In the long-run, a
FE due to inclusion, and therefore E(RD′i,t−1ci) 6= 0.
24 We check the change rate of CEO variables, most of them are under 10%, so within-variation is low.
25 Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond proved that all ∆RDi,s−1(s = 2, . . . t) could be IV candidates for
RDi,t−1. To avoid overidentification, I only adopt RDi,t−1. The reasons are (a) it is more closely related
to RDi,t−1; (b) it can be expressed as the FD of all lagged FD of the dependent variable, time-variant
independent variables, and idiosyncratic error, so containing all information of all other IV candidates.
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Table 3.5: Dynamic model with RE-IV (Hausman-Taylor)
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firm with overseas CEO has an accumulative 2.76 higher R&D ratios in a long-run frame
compared to those firms without overseas CEOs.
For the career experiences in various functions, production experience significantly re-
duces R&D ratio by 1.5-1.9, equivalent to 72.7%-89% of its average level. Innovative CEO
spurs R&D ratio by 0.97-1.43, equivalent to 45.5%-65% of the average level. In contrast,
finance experience has a negative but insignificant impact. Based on the results, innovative
CEO is more sensitive to the opportunities and threats in pursuing R&D activities, so he/she
has higher incentives to invest more in R&D activities. These results are broadly consistent
with those literature explaining the result with Upper Echelon theory. To see the long-run
effects, the accumulative impacts of production or innovation experiences are around -3.9
and 1.9, respectively.
For BOD’s experiences, every 10% more directors with a bachelor’s or higher degree
leads to 0.1 higher R&D ratio in percent, equivalent to around 4.7% of its average level. For
some special experiences, every 10% more members with the previous government expe-
rience impede the R&D ratio significantly by 0.04 as a result of risk aversion, comparable
to 1.7% of its average level. In terms of long-run impact, every 10% more directors with
previous government background would lead to an accumulative 0.08 lower R&D ratio in
the future. In comparison, the impact of BOD’s current government position is insignifi-
cant due to the potential net effect of risk aversion and resource abundance. For industrial
experiences, 10% more members with marketing experience raise the R&D ratio in percent
by 0.03, equivalent to around 1.5% of its average level. Though the impacts of marketing
experience and formal education are insignificant at 10% level in dynamic perspective, the
direction tells a consistent story with static view.
Based on above results, after controlling for lagged R&D strategy, most of human cap-
ital factors still show significant impacts on R&D expenditures. These results imply that
CEO and BOD play important roles in R&D decision-making due to their active partici-
pation in daily operation and their decision-making power. However, some human capital
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factors, such as CEO’s finance background and BOD’s marketing experience, become in-
significant after controlling the time-trend of R&D inputs. One possible explanation is that
lagged R&D inputs contain lagged human capital factors, so they have multicollinearity
issue with human capital factors at current period, leading to the insignificant impacts.26
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between managerial human capital and
corporate R&D incentives. We use various specific experiences of both CEO and BOD
as novel measures of human capital characteristics, potentially reflecting their unobserved
managerial skills, perspectives, and risk attitudes.
We find that the CEO and directors’ career experiences in various functions have sig-
nificant impacts on R&D investment. In particular, innovation experiences in (R&D or
design) and marketing are positively associated with R&D investment, while previous ex-
periences in production and finance have negative impacts. Production and finance back-
grounds reduce the R&D percentage ratio by 1.6 and 1.7 respectively, equivalent to 72.7%
of its average level; in contrast, past experience with innovation-related work leads to a 1.3
percent points increase in R&D input ratio. Moreover, 10% increase in BOD members with
marketing experience can raise the average R&D investment level by around 0.03 percent
point%. 10% more directors with previous government backgrounds significantly reduces
R&D ratio by 0.05 percent point.
For other human capital factors, the high-educated board leads to a larger amount of
R&D investment. Directors’ past government experience reduces R&D spending signif-
icantly while current government positions have a statistically insignificant impact. The
impact of the CEO’s overseas experience is ambiguous and sensitive to different model
setups. It has a significantly positive impact on R&D investment in a dynamic frame.




RISK ATTITUDE, DEBT TOLERANCE AND HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT
BEHAVIOR
4.1 Introduction
To have a broad picture of how human capital influences different levels of national
economy, we then expand our research to household-level. In recent years, the vital finan-
cial market in China provides investors with wide variety of financial products to allocate
assets, smooth intertemporal consumption and accumulate wealth. Household’s financial
participation, in turn, raises enterprise’s capital, and promote persistent economy growth. 1
However, the financial participation rate in China does not reach anticipated level. Based
on the statistics, “insufficient financial knowledge” and “limited household wealth” are
two major reasons, accounting for 52.51% and 50.72%. “The risk is too high” accounts
for 18.65% and “never heard about certain financial instruments” accounts for 10%. The
portfolio composition and trading behaviors also corroborate above concerns. Large ma-
jority of investors prefer a smoother long-term or mid-run investment strategy rather than
a short-term or high-frequency trading.2 For portfolio composition, top three methods to
allocate wealth are stock purchase, bank financing and bank deposits. Among all stock
investors, 48.8% mainly invested in main board or SME board, 10.8% in GEM, while only
4.4% preferred STAR (Sci-Tech).
Many researchers are thus interested in identifying the influencing factors of invest-
ment decision. The objective conditions set financial constraints for investors, such as
wealth, income and family features (Agnew et al., 2003; Rosen and Wu, 2004; Campbell,
1 The individual investors in China only have a 11.45% stock participation rate (160 million). These and
all following statistics come from the report of investors in the national stock market survey (2019).
2 38.1% prefer the “band operation in middle-term”, 35.2% prefer the “value investing in long-term”, and
only 17.9% prefer the “fast-in fast-out in short-term”.
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2006). Existing papers also discussed how one’s interaction with external environment in-
fluence investment behavior, such as social interaction and peer effects (Hong et al., 2004;
Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2012; Li, 2014; Liang and Guo, 2015). However, these factors only
partially or indirectly explain one’s motivation on financial behavior, but the importance of
human capital is always neglected or seldom discussed (Feng and Seasholes, 2005).
A line of papers explored how household head’s human capital influences financial
decision and performance. Demographic characteristics and general experiences, including
gender, age, education, etc., reflect unobserved cognitive ability and personality, so acting
as the measures for individual’s human capital to some extent (Barber and Odean, 2001;
Almenberg and Breber, 2015; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Christiansen et al., 2008).
Besides these indirect and composited measures, many papers also discussed some
specific human capital factors. For instance, the cognitive skills, measured by test-scores,
are found to have significant impact on financial behavior (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005; Chris-
telis et al., 2010; Grinblatt et al., 2011). The influencing channels include financial aware-
ness, information constraints, etc.. For the relevant concepts related to cognitive ability,
financial knowledge, literacy and efficacy are widely discussed (Rooij et al., 2011; Abreu
and Mendes, 2010; Fernandes et al., 2014; Hsiao and Tsai, 2018). They are found not only
to encourage households’ investment in risky assets, such as stocks and other derivatives,
but also to motivate the portfolio diversification.
As to personality traits, risk aversion in different domains potentially indicates house-
hold’s risky investment propensity, but also implies the fraction of risky assets in house-
holds’ asset portfolio (Cohn et al., 1975; Keller and Siegrist, 2006). Another relevant
concept, ambiguity aversion, is also examined to be negatively related to the participation
propensity and depth, while lead to higher portfolio diversification (Dimmock et al., 2016).
Various types of personality traits also jointly influence households’ financial decision.
Risk tolerance interacts with the trust attitude to affect the risky investment decision, and
they further lubricate the financial system and contribute to financial market development
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(Bucciol et al., 2019). Household consumption decision and investment performance are
influenced by financial literacy and risk attitudes jointly (Zhang et al., 2021). Exploring
this topic in-depth is also of great value in Chinese cases, due to the current condition of
immature market, asymmetric information and unskilled investors. Therefore, we further




We first assume that each household has a following utility function U (.) over its ter-
minal wealth W based on constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) preference assumption:




γ ∈ (−∞,∞) is a preference parameter, depreciating one’s utility on the actual wealth
level.3 Larger γ means lower utility with the same wealth, implying more risk averse.
In a single-period model, an investor holds two types of assets, risk-free assets (trea-
sury bond, deposits, etc.) with a risk-free interest rate rf = 0, and a risky portfolio (stock,
fund, etc.). The value change on risky portfolio during this period has a binary distribution,
either going up by ru with probability π, or dropping by rd with probability (1− π):
P (r = ri) =

π, i = u
1− π, i = d
(4.2)
Investor aims at maximizing expected utility by investing a fraction h of the initial wealth
3 In our empirical work, we define a group of risk-loving person, so we allow γ to be smaller than 0.
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w in risky portfolio, so we have:
max
π [w (1 + hru)]
1−γ + (1− π) [w (1 + hrd)]1−γ
1− γ
(4.3)
s.t. 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1











By plugging h∗ back into the objective function, with the optimal terminal wealth wp
conditional on investing in risky portfolio, the terminal utility is:
U (wp) = A
w1−γ
1− γ
= U (aw) (4.5)
where A = (
ru − rd
mru − rd
)1−γ[(1− π)m1−γ + π] > 0 and a = A
1
1−γ .
Only when the optimal excess return of risky investment surpasses its fixed costs c,
investor would prefer risky investment:
wp − w = (α− 1)w > c (4.6)
G(c) is the cumulative distribution function of c, so the risk investment probability P is:
P = G [(α− 1)w] (4.7)
We take the F.O.C. on equation (4.4) and (4.7) with respect to the risk preference
















Results above indicate that risk averse persons are more reluctant to engage in risky
portfolio and also invest less to it. Those who have better perspectives towards market and
self-efficacy are more willing to participate in risky investment and invest more. Therefore,
investment probability and depth are both decreasing functions of risk averse and increasing
with market perception, as well as two sets of household factors, X1 and X2:
h∗ = h(π, γ, X1) and P = p(π, γ, X2) (4.9)
Detailed explanation and derivation of this subsection are in Appendix C.1.
4.2.2 The Nature of Risk Attitude and Perception
γ is risk attitude, which is a preference parameter. Based on the existing papers,
preference is the natural counterpart of human capital, especially one’s personality traits.
Though the causal relationship between risk attitude and human capital factors remains to
be explored, their general association is widely discussed. Risk attitude is proved to be
affected by three groups of factors, natural or social environment, one’s cognitive skills,
and personality traits.
Existing papers proved that, among these three groups of factors, personality traits ex-
plain majority of risk preference. By using Big Five personality trait measures, many papers
provided empirical evidence that openness to experiences and extraversion is positively as-
sociated with risk preference, while conscientiousness and agreeableness have the negative
relationship. Under other measurement of personality, impulsive sensation-seeking is also
closely related to the risk attitude. Compared to personality traits, environment and cogni-
tive skills are only weakly related to one’s risk attitude. Therefore, we view risk attitude as
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a mapping of various personality traits.
Heckman et al. (2008) and other scholars found that personality traits are relatively
stable across lifetime and conditions. Along one’s life cycle, though these traits evolve
overtime, they change and fluctuate drastically during the childhood and adolescence, while
having a relatively flatter evolving curve during the adulthood because of the personality
maturity and emotional stability. Acting as a nature counterpart of personality, risk attitude
is also relatively stable across one’s life-cycle, proved by the empirical evidence.
Some papers directly investigated the stability of risk preference across time, domains,
and situations. They find that as individuals grow older, they become more risk averse, and
their risk preferences converge to those of adults gradually during adolescence. This find-
ing is in line with a standard model of skill formation. From the stage of adulthood to
old age, the trend to greater risk aversion continues but is less pronounced. Though the
sudden shocks in some risk domains, such as the sudden death of family member, shift risk
attitude to some extent, the magnitude is comparatively small to its mean-level. Temporary
variations in risk preference may also exist in terms of emotion swings and short-run en-
vironmental changes.However, they only deviate risk preference from the “baseline level
of risk attitude” in the short-run with small magnitude, so the risk attitude curve shows a
mean-reversion pattern.
The market perception parameter, π, is determined by two major factors, objective
market condition and individual’s risk perception. The former is given by external situation.
The latter refers to one’s subjective judgement about potential risks or outcome uncertainty
in different domains. Therefore, risk perception deviates one individual’s perceptive risk
from its actual level, and it is closely related to the human capital factors.
Many papers pointed out that the formation and change of risk perception mainly have
two dimensions, which are cognitive and emotion/personality dimensions. Cognitive skills
relate to how an individual know and understand the risk, while the latter relates to how
one feel about it. From the cognitive aspect, self-efficacy (reasoning skills) will influence
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the evaluation accuracy on risk. As to personality aspect, papers proved that Big Five per-
sonality traits all closely related to how people feel about the risks. For instance, openness,
extraversion, and emotional stability (neuroticism) ease one’s fear of risk, leading to lower
risk perception. Like risk attitude, the risk perception largely depends on one’s human cap-
ital (cognitive skills and non-cognitive traits), so it is relatively stable across life cycle and
external shocks after entering the adulthood.
The risk attitude and perception are potentially affected by a same group of personal-
ity traits, so they are association to each other. Though opinions in papers are inconsistent,
majority has the following conclusion. When facing risky situation, risk takers tend to rec-
ognize and weigh positive outcomes. Those who have strong willingness to take risk focus
more on the potential benefits, and thus have lower risk-perception scores. In contrast, risk
avoiders pay too much attention to the negative consequences and tend to overestimate the
possibility of potential threats and losses, resulting in biased risk perception.
In next section, we discuss in detail how we measure above parameters related to
human capital with using the survey questions, and what personality traits they may reflect.
4.3 Data Resources and Variable Selection
We use China Urban Household Consumer Finance Survey 2012 (CUHCFS 2012)
as the main database.4 This round of survey is collected online, including 3,122 effective
urban samples from 24 cities in China.
Among these samples, some investors may not be profit-driven, but trading for the
purpose of entertainment. Entertainment-driven investors care less about the potential loss,
so they have higher participation propensity but shallower participation depth. The in-
fluencing mechanism of human capital for these two types of investors thus should be
different. In this paper, we mainly focus on the profit-driven investors. We assume that
retired persons have more leisure time and personal wealth, so they have higher chance to
4 CUHCFS has four rounds of surveys (2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012). However, only the last round has
the questions related to financial knowledge and personality traits, so we only use CUHCFS 2012.
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be entertainment-driven. Therefore, we drop the retired samples with males above 60 years
old and females above 55.
Moreover, outliers in household assets (higher than 10 million RMB) and monthly
income (higher than 30 thousand RMB) are also chopped, because they might also be
the entertainment-driven investors with different investment strategies. We also remove
the samples without wage income, because they are either full-time investors trading as
their career, or unemployed person with sparse money to invest. After doing the sample
selection, we drop 95 households and keep 3,027 effective samples, retaining 97% of the
original records.
4.3.1 Risk Attitude in General Domain
As mentioned, some demographic characteristics, such as gender and age, may reflect
the general risk attitude to some extent, but they are the measures for compound human
capital. To extract the pure effect of risk attitude in general domain, one of the widely
used proxies is “test-based” risk attitude. It is measured by the magnitude of risk premium
an individual is willing to pay in general. In CUHCFS 2012, it is reflected by the answer
to a lottery game “you can either directly take a reward equal to your annual income, or
play a lottery to win twice the income or get nothing. What is the required probability
of winning this game?”. We adopt it as the baseline proxy because it is relatively more
objective and less likely to be affected by personal behaviors or environmental changes
compared to other measures in CUHCFS 2012. We do not directly adopt the continuous
“required probability” due to the potential problem of nonlinear impact. Instead, we use
the probability of 55% as a cutoff to create a dummy, classifying respondents into risk-
averse and risk-loving groups.5 Based on the descriptive statistics (Table 4.1), 44.6% of the
respondents are risk averse under this criterion.
However, this measure has disadvantages. The respondents need to calculate the ex-
5 Most people tend to be risk averse, so using 55% can better distinguish the risk-averse person from the
risk-preferred ones. We also try 60%, and the results are robust (36.96% report a risk-averse attitude).
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Table 4.1: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Personality traits
pected return and estimate a tolerable risk premium, so this measure turns out to be a mix
effect of the actual risk attitude and numeracy skill. Besides this measurement error, re-
spondents might also “randomly” give an expected probability rather than calculating it
earnestly. Therefore, the test-based proxy has the measurement error due to the evaluation
and report bias. Finally, it reflects one’s risk attitude in general, but tells little information
in other facets, such as finance.
To address the severity of measurement error, we try to fix it by using a second proxy
in different risk attitude fact.6 Risk attitude in finance facet is directly reflected by the self-
reported tolerance towards financial uncertainty. In CUHCFS 2012, answers to “which
kind of investment would you prefer?” are classified into five levels, from “high return high
risk” to “don’t want to take any risk”. For simplicity, we classify these five levels into three
categories, which are risk-loving (high risk or relatively high risk), risk-neutral (moderate
risk) and risk-averse (low risk or no risk). Based on the descriptive statistics (Table 4.1),
26.96% of the household heads are risk-loving, 40.24% are risk-neutral, and the remaining
32.8% are risk-loving.
We find a severe mismatch that only 1,644 respondents (54.31% of entire sample) have
the consistent answers towards test-based and self-report questions. Therefore, we use two
6 If one is risk-neutral in self-reported measure, we give it tolerance to match with either risk-loving or
risk-averse in test-based measure.
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strategies to address this issue. First, we only use “matched samples” at a cost of losing
significant number of samples. Among matched samples, risk-averse persons account for
44.83% and the remaining 55.17% are risk-loving. Another method is using test-based
proxy in general domain as the base, and filling mismatched samples with risk attitude
in finance facet, because the mismatch mainly comes from the arbitrary answers to the
“lottery game”. The advantage is that it minimizes the measurement error by keeping all
effective samples. In Table 4.1, the descriptive statistics show that 49.79% are risk-averse
and 50.21% are risk-loving in this new measure.
4.3.2 Debt Tolerance - Financial Risk Attitude
In CUHCFS 2012, debt attitude is reflected by the highest tolerance level towards the
debt, measured in times of a household’s annual income. Due to its self-reported nature,
debt tolerance is a mixture of the vulnerability of family’s financing, household head’s abil-
ity to manage assets, and most importantly, his/her personality traits.7 Financial integrity
depends on the nature of household’s assets and incomes. Stable income (wage income,
etc.) and low-risk assets (treasury bill, bank deposits, etc.) reduce the financing vulnerabil-
ity when facing sudden shocks, and thus a family can manage and tolerate more debts.
Besides the objective factors, debt tolerance is also influenced by the human capital
factors. From the aspect of cognitive skills, the financing stability is also influenced by
household head’s ability to manage assets, including financial literacy and cognitive skills.
Those who have higher financial efficacy and reasoning skills possess a better sense and
stronger capacity to manage the household wealth well, so expecting a higher expected
returns from risky financing.
Most importantly, debt tolerance reflects one’s non-cognitive personality. From the
aspect of personality traits, debt tolerance first works as a proxy for one’s risk attitude. Un-
like the “test-based” measure in the last sub-section which reflects the risk attitude in the
7 We do the estimation by regressing debt tolerance on all the objective and subjective factors mentioned
below, all getting significant results.
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general domain, debt tolerance is more related to one’s attitude towards financial market
and financial vulnerability. It thus measures household head’s risk attitude in the finance
facet.8 Comparing these two proxies, the general risk attitude is relatively stable with grad-
ual evolution and little fluctuation across lifetime, while the financial one is more sensitive
toward external shocks in short run, especially the market turbulence. The correlation coef-
ficient between risk attitudes in general and finance domain is only 0.06, giving very weak
association. Therefore, they measure risk attitudes from different aspects and time frames
with neglectable multicollinearity.
Besides risk attitude, debt tolerance also reflects other personality traits. For instance,
due to the self-reported nature, self-confidence and trust attitude may also influence debt
tolerance. First, the less-confident persons prefer to use in-hand assets to finance household
wealth rather than seeking for external debt, so they have lower debt tolerance. Moreover,
when reporting debt tolerance, they potentially overestimate their own financial efficacy
and underestimate financial risk, so having better perspective towards debt health. For trust
attitude, those who trust more on the market and external information, are more tolerant to
the debt payable.
To measure debt tolerance, “how many times of the annual income” may have a non-
linear impact on risky investment. For instance, the impact of jumping from 1 to 2 times
may not be the same as that of changing from 8 to 9 times. This “self-report” measure
also depends on the self-evaluation, so it is not perfectly comparable across individuals.
Therefore, we create a dummy to classify high and low debt tolerance by setting a proper
cutoff. In existing papers using U.S. data, “highest bank loan an individual can get” is a
widely used and preferable cutoff. Unfortunately, there is no clear ceiling for bank loan in
China, which is bank- and customer-specific. However, most family can get a bank loan
around 30 times of their monthly income, so we use three times the annual income as the
cutoff. Based on descriptive statistics (Table 4.1), the original measure is left-skewed with
8 Though we have a direct “self-reported” proxy for financial risk attitude mentioned in last sub-section,
it is too straightforward, directly inferring one’s financial behavior, so we adopt debt tolerance instead.
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an average value of 4.1 times and largest value of 12 times. More than 54.7% households
can only handle a low level of debt, which is less than 3 times the annual income.
4.3.3 Dependent Variables - Financial Behaviors
For financial behavior, we mainly focus on the participation propensity of stocks, be-
cause stocks are the most accessible risky product in China. We use “whether a household
holds stock accounts” as the proxy for the long-run stock investment propensity. Besides
the participation decision, we also discuss the participation depth, measured by the pro-
portion of household wealth allocated to stocks. It also partially addresses the “inactive
trading” issue in account-holding measure.9 However, the investment depth measure po-
tentially bears the measurement or reporting bias, and the high-frequency trading behavior
may further lead to its large fluctuation in the short-run.10 Therefore, we need to treat these
results dialectically, explaining them jointly with that of the “account-holding dummy”.
We also consider the participation propensity and depth of an alternative product,
which is mutual fund. It is a portfolio of various risky and less-risky products, carefully
selected, bundled and sold by financial agents. Due to the diversification, the idiosyncratic
risk of these products may hedge each other, so mutual fund has relatively lower risk than
stock though it is still risky product. By considering both stocks and funds, we can compare
the different impacts of human capital on financial products with different level of risk.
Based on the descriptive statistics (Table 4.2), around 40.27% and 38.2% of the house-
holds have stock and fund accounts respectively. Among those who invest in stocks, 87.1
thousand RMB are allocated to stocks, equivalent to 4.98% of the household wealth. The
magnitude for mutual fund is around 49.8 thousand RMB, equivalent to 3.96% of family
assets. Compared to the developed countries, the participation rate in China is much lower
than that of United States. The same for the investment proportion that U.S. residents
9 Some investors do not trade actively even if they have accounts, so “account holding” might be biased.
10 It is hard to precisely report the exact amount invest in stocks. However, we assume this bias is randomly
distributed across households, so we simply ignore its impact.
77
allocates 14% of their assets on stock, which is much higher than that in China.
Table 4.2: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of risky investment
4.3.4 Control Variables
For household heads, we consider their age, gender, education, and marital status,
because they indirectly reflect the compound human capital. For instance, older or female
individuals are more risk averse in nature, so they have lower incentive to purchase risky
assets. These controls may also be the proxy for cognitive ability, such as logical thinking
and reasoning, influencing market prediction accuracy. Marital status may also shift one’s
incentives to invest.
For household factors, family composition, especially the number of dependent chil-
dren and elders, has a significant impact on financial behaviors. Higher burden to support
kids or elders creates incentive to accumulate assets faster via risky investment, but larger
uncertainty motivates household to choose stable strategies. For financial condition, family
with more wealth and stable income are more capable to bear the investment failure with
higher risk tolerance. Living in big city benefits more from the advanced financial market
but also face the more severe financial constraints due to a higher living burden.
Based on statistics (Table 4.3), 71.4% of the household heads are males, and 84% are
married. 56.5% do not have any dependent kids, following by “one-child” (38.7%).11 Most
11 The dependent children are defined as the preschool and school-age kids.
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households do not have elders to support (77.5%), but around 10% still have more than one
elders. The income distribution is left-skewed with 12.8% high-income, 27.1% middle-
income and 60% low-income households. The average household wealth is 1.67 million
RMB, and around 22% of the families live in big cities.12 Compared to other household
surveys in China, CUHCFS 2012 has the much younger and highly educated household
heads, with an average age of 33.9 and 87.7% college or higher degree owners. One pos-
sible explanation is that CUHCFS 2012 was collected online for the urban households, so
some respondents with certain characteristics are excluded. Therefore, we need to explain
the results carefully because they are only applicable for specific samples.
Table 4.3: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of control variables
12 Big city is defined as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.
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4.4 Participation Decision on Stocks and Funds
4.4.1 Participation Decision in a Long-run Framework
We first explore the impacts of two measures for risk attitude on participation propen-
sity. stocki is the stock investment decision, measured by “whether hold stock accounts”,
which is a propensity measure in a long-run frame. HCi includes the “test-based” risk atti-
tude and debt tolerance of the household heads. Xi is a vector of household and household
head’s controls. εi is the idiosyncratic error.
This participation decision is a binary variable, so we adopt Probit model to estimate.
A latent variable, stock∗i , in a general model specification can be constructed as:
stock∗i = α1HCi + α2Xi + εi
Therefore, the binary stock participation decision can be viewed as an indicator of
whether latent variable stock∗i is positive:
stocki = 1 [stock∗i > 0|HCi, Xi] =

1, ifstock∗i > 0.
0, otherwise.
(4.10)
To implement the Probit method, we investigate general risk attitude and debt toler-
ance in a sequential manner, adding them gradually into the model and then include both.
According to the pseudo R2, personality traits have strong explanatory power in the vari-
ation of participation propensity (Table 4.4). When only controlling for household and its
head’s general factors, Probit estimation gives a pseudo R2 of 14.11%, while the explana-
tion power increases to 17.36% or 15.16% after controlling for general risk attitude and
debt tolerance, respectively. After including both factors, pseudo R2 raises to 18.5%, in-
dicating that personality traits play important roles in participation decision and should be
isolated from the unobserved error term.
Based on the results, those who are generally risk averse, have 18.2% lower possibility
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of stock purchasing compared to risk-loving respondents. Low-debt-tolerant persons have
4.3% lower stock investment incentives. Adding them both into the model, the estimates
reduce slightly to 18% and 3.9% respectively, while they are still significant. The results
imply that risk aversion in general and finance domains both prevent people from partici-
pating in stock market. Since they measure different facets of risk attitude, including them
both in the model still gives significant impacts. Moreover, debt tolerance also reflects other
personality traits, verified by the significant estimate after controlling general risk attitude.
As to household heads’ demographic factors, olders are reluctant in purchasing stocks,
while males and college-education ones have higher incentive to participate. However, after
controlling general risk attitude and debt tolerance, the significance of age and gender is
gone, and marginal effect of college education reduces though its impact still significant.
One possible reason is that they potentially reflect the heterogeneity in cognitive skills
and personality across different cohorts. Therefore, after controlling for the proxies of
personality and cognition, individuals in different age, gender and education are indifferent
in making risky investment decision.
For other controls, richer households are more willing to purchase stocks due to suf-
ficient financial supports to bear the failure risk. Middle-income families have the highest
participation incentives. Possible reason is that low-income families lack stable financial
sources, and high-income families prefer other investment methods, so they have lower
incentives to buy stocks. Household with more kids or elders has significantly higher in-
centive to purchase stocks. Those who live in big cities are reluctant to hold stock due to
high living burden with less spare money.
We also check the impacts of personality traits on fund participation. Fund is an al-
ternative product in the class of risky assets with a lower risk. General risk attitude and
debt tolerance also have notably impacts on fund purchasing (Table 4.5). Risk aversion in
general and finance domains reduce fund purchasing probability by 11.9% and 6%, respec-
tively. The results indicate that even after we control for the long-run propensity in fund
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Table 4.5: Fund Participation Decision (Probit Estimation)
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investment determined by the general risk attitude, risk aversion in finance facet further re-
duces the probability of purchasing fund by 6% more. In contrast, the magnitude of general
risk attitude is smaller than that in stock purchasing, because risk averse persons are more
sensitive to riskier products, such as stocks.
Elder has lower incentives in fund purchasing before controlling for any direct mea-
sures of personality traits. Every one-year older increases the probability of fund invest-
ment by 0.23%. College education significantly motivates persons to invest in fund with
8.9% higher possibility. The same as the stock investment, the significance of age is gone,
and the magnitude of college education shrinks after controlling for the pure effects of per-
sonality traits. These results indicate that demographic characteristics influence risky asset
investment mainly through the channel of human capital, especially the personality traits.
Unlike the stock investment, among three income categories, high-income households have
the highest propensity to purchase funds. One possible reason is that the marginal utility
gained via risky investment is smaller for high-income households. Therefore, they have
lower motivation to allocate assets on the riskier products, but prefer to invest in the less
risky instead, such as funds, to gain reasonable returns. People in big cities is not neces-
sarily to have lower incentives in fund purchasing, because funds are relatively safer with
decent returns.
4.4.2 Instantaneous Participation Decision
As mentioned, account-holding dummy reflects the participation propensity in a long-
run frame, implying a general attitude towards risky investment. However, it potentially has
the issue of “inactive trading” and does not reflect how an individual with specific human
capital reacts to the market turbulence during certain period. Thus, we further use “the
proportion of household assets allocated to stocks/funds” as the supplement to partially
address this issue and explain the impacts of human capital on instantaneous decision.
The dependent variable, stock proportion in percent point, is censored with stock pi ∈
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[0, 100]. Around half of the respondents who meet certain criterion has stock pi = 0, while
others have stock pi ∈ (0, 100]. Therefore, we use Tobit method to estimate, and provide a
marginal effect of participation decision. We define a latent or uncensored stock proportion,
stock p∗i , which is the true value of stock pi when the censoring mechanism is not applied:
stock p∗i = ρ1HCi + ρ2Xi + µi
Therefore, the marginal probability is:
P (stock pi > 0|HCi, Xi) = P (stock p∗i > 0|HCi, Xi) (4.11)
Based on the results, the significance of debt tolerance is gone with smaller magnitude,
but the direction is the same (Table 4.6). Due to a bad stock market condition during 2011-
2012, some investors, especially those who are more debt-tolerant or less risk averse in
finance facet, choose to take a wait-and-see strategy in the short-run. Though they are still
willing to participate in the risky investment, other risky products are better alternatives.
Therefore, persons with different debt tolerance level are comparatively indifferent in stock
purchasing with the reluctant attitude. In the long-run, those who are financially risk-loving
are still interested in stock investment, so account-holding dummy significantly reacts to the
financial risk attitude. Unlike debt tolerance, no matter how the market condition changes,
the persons who are risk averse in general tend to avoid the risky investment with 18%
lower probability of stock participation. Above results indicate that risk aversion in finance
domain is more sensitive to the market change compared to risk attitude in a general sense,
which is intuitively reasonable.
Other variables are relatively consistent, except for number of dependent children.
Families with more kids have higher incentives of risky investment, aiming at accumulating
family wealth quicker to support their kids in the long run. However, if facing a short-run
downturn condition, they prefer to temporarily leave the market, to avoid the potential
drastic turbulence in household financial condition. Unlike dependent kids, elders are not
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necessarily to be supported, especially in Chinese urban households with high education.
Based on Chinese tradition, elders accumulate more wealth and provide more financial
supports to their next generation, rather than receiving support from kids. This tradition
encourages risky investment in both long- and short-run with insensitive reaction to market
turbulence, even though its impact is relatively smaller when the market condition is poor.
Wealthy or middle-income households still have higher incentives to purchase stocks in the
short run, with lower motivation in downturn market condition.
We also check the instantaneous participation decision on funds (Table 4.6). Unlike
the stock market, fund market is relatively stable in 2011-2012, so most results are consis-
tent with those in the long-run perspective. Risk averse persons in general are still reluctant
to purchase funds, with 8.5% lower participation probability. Individuals who are less tol-
erant to debt, reflecting a lower risk tolerance in finance domain, have significantly weaker
incentives to invest in funds, with a comparable magnitude of 5.1%.
Other interesting findings include that those who live in the big cities are more will-
ing to purchase funds if using “zero-investment amount” as the measure of participation
decision. To explain it, when the stock market experienced a downturn, funds act as the
preferred alternative risky assets with higher return than risk-free assets, so these investors
would shift to fund market to secure wealth. Though well-educated persons generally have
higher incentives to participate in fund market, they are not necessarily actively trading the
fund with an insignificant impact.
Comparing above results with those of stocks across two different participation mea-
sures, we find that the impacts of human capital factors on the participation decision in
risky assets are sensitive to market condition and risk level of the products. Risk attitude
in both domains is more sensitive to the riskier products, reflecting by a larger magnitude
in stock participation. However, when facing a severe market condition, investors with
certain personality traits are more reactive to market turbulence, especially for the riskier
assets. For instance, financial risk attitude is more sensitive to market change than risk
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preference in general sense. Those who are financially risk-loving change their attitude in
stock investment when the market condition is poor, leading to an insignificant estimate. In
contrast, risk attitude in general facet reflects one’s long run preference, so it has consistent
impact on risky investment regardless the market condition, especially when the financial
risk attitude is controlled. For other objective factors, such as household’s financial condi-
tion, they react relatively insensitive to market change, implying that preference factors are
the main drive-force of strategical change to market turbulence.
4.5 Investment Depth on Stocks and Funds
Not only the stock/fund participation propensity, but also the investment depth is af-
fected by the human capital factors. As mentioned, participation depth is censored with
stock pi = 0 when certain criteria are reached, while others would invest stock pi ∈
(0, 100]. Therefore, we use Tobit model to get the marginal effect on investment depth
conditional on participation.
This uncensored value, stock p∗i , is assumed to have a normal distribution, and stock pi
is assigned the value based on following criteria:
stock pi = max(stock p
∗
i , 0) =

stock p∗i , if stock p
∗
i 0.
0, if stock p∗i < 0.
(4.12)
After implementing the Tobit model, we find that people with different age and gender
are indifferent in stock investment depth (Table 4.7, Column 1 and 2). Risk averse persons
in general facet allocate 1.47 percent point less assets on stocks. Compared with the mean
level of stock proportion, which is 2%, this magnitude is huge, and equivalent to 73.5%.
Financial risk attitude, measured by debt tolerance, is more sensitive towards market turbu-
lence. Those who are financially risk-averse are not distinguished from risk-loving persons
when face downturn market condition. It is rational for financially risk-loving investors
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to take wait-and-see strategy, placing fixed amount of assets on stocks but allocating more
wealth on other alternative products in better condition. Though total investment on risky
assets is larger for financially risk-loving investors, the fraction that allocated to stocks is
not necessarily to be higher than financially risk-averse people.
Compared the impacts on stock participation propensity and depth with the same de-
pendent variable, the results are relatively consistent.13 Those who are generally risk averse
not only have inactive trading behavior with lower incentives, but also allocate less assets on
stocks when face market change. Both participation decision and depth are insignificantly
influenced by financial risk attitude, measured by the debt tolerance. With the similar ex-
planation mentioned before, insignificant impact of debt tolerance potentially comes from
the sensitive reaction of financially risk-averse persons towards the market turbulence.
We also check how these two personality factors influence the depth of fund invest-
ment in a stable market condition. Based on the results (Table 4.7, Column 4 and 5), their
impacts on funds and stocks are similar. Those who are generally risk averse tend to allo-
cate 0.7% less assets on funds, equivalent to 17.7% of its average level. This magnitude is
relatively smaller compared to that of stocks. In accord with our expectation, risk aversion
in finance also influences the fund investment depth in a negative direction. Lower level of
debt tolerance potentially discourages investors to allocate larger proportion of wealth on
risky products, with the magnitude of 0.42%. Under severe condition, as an alternative way
of risky investment, funds absorbed even more household assets from stocks, especially for
those who are financially risk averse, so this impact is potentially magnified.
For other composited human capital measures, as getting older, one tends to allocate
more assets on stocks but less on funds, though the magnitude of its impact is marginal.
One possible explanation is that young persons are more vulnerable due to the unstable
income and high living burden, and have sparse time to manage stocks. Males prefer to
allocate more wealth on riskier products which require more knowledge and stronger skills,
13 The results are robust with marginal magnitude changes when we only use the matched sample.
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while allocate less assets on funds with lower risk. Persons with high level of formal
education are more capable in handling riskier products due to stronger cognitive skills,
richer knowledge, and more confidence, reflected by a larger amount of stock investment.
However, due to the “pre-packaged” nature, funds only require lower trading skills, so the
assets allocated to funds is indifferent across persons with different education level.
For other controls, family with more elders potentially have richer financial supports
from them, especially in the well-educated urban family, while more kids may encourage
family to seek higher returns via risky investment. Therefore, elders and kids both lead
to a larger amount of stock and fund investment. Wealthy family prefers to invest more
in stocks but less in funds due to the stronger financial supports to handle riskier assets.
Middle-income households allocate more assets on stock due to healthier financial condi-
tion and higher utility from risky investment. However, the high-income households are not
necessarily to purchase more stocks because they have lower incentives to gain marginal
returns, and funds seem to be a saver product to place the assets. Due to higher living bur-
den, households located in the big cities allocate more assets on housing property, liquid
assets, or low-risk assets to meet the urgent needs in the future, instead of investing in risky
assets like stocks, especially in this downturn period.
4.6 Sensitivity Test
As mentioned in the theoretical part, existing papers point out that unobservable cog-
nitive and non-cognitive skills are relative stable. Though the personality traits evolve
gradually over the lifecycle, they are sufficiently stable across special situations (Borghans
et al., 2008). Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) examined personality change is insensitive to
the adverse life-time events, which is further verified by others using different age groups
and time-frame (Elkins et al., 2017). In this case, personality traits can be used as the stable
inputs in economic decision, and the endogeneity issue caused by reverse or simultaneous
causality is weak.
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However, some may argue that omitted variables problem might exist, because we
cannot control every influencing factor. The key idea of this paper is to extract unobservable
personality traits from the error term by using proxies. Therefore, the omitted variable issue
in the decision-making research should be addressed to a large extent. Even though, we still
adopt the IV-Probit and IV-Tobit methods to further check the robustness of our results:
First stage: HCi = γ1Zi + γ2Xi + εi (4.13)
Second stage: invi = α1HC∗i + α2Xi + εi (4.14)
invpi = β1HC
∗
i + β2Xi + µi (4.15)
We refer to “neighborhood” strategy to select instruments Zi (Brown et al., 2008;
Robalino and Pfaff, 2012).14 In our case, only the information of city is available, which
may be a too large geographic concept for individuals to share the similar human capital
features. Therefore, besides the city, we also use occupation, age, and gender to categorize
respondents into different groups. We use the proportion of peers within the same group
who are risk averse in general and finance facets as the instruments for these two personality
traits. We drop the samples who are the sole member within the group, so sample size
reduces a little bit to 2,678.
Based on the results, the estimates are robust, further supporting our baseline results.
Both stock and fund participation rates react notably to general risk aversion in the long
run, reducing 17.1% and 11.2%, respectively (Table 4.8, Column 1 and 2). They are also
motivated by the high debt tolerance with larger and significant impact on stock participa-
tion of 7.3%. For an instantaneous measure of participation decision, risk averse persons
in general facet have lower possibility of 17.4% and 8.3% to hold stocks and funds in 2012
when facing severe condition in the stock market (Table 4.8, Column 3 and 4). In contrast,
the impact of financial risk attitude becomes insignificant for stock participation, while re-
mains insignificant for funds, implying its sensitive reaction towards market change. As to
14 These papers use the average values of endogenous variables in the neighborhood as the instruments.
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Table 4.8: Endogeneity Adjustment (IV-Probit and IV-Tobit)
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participation depth, risk attitude in general facet significantly reduces stock and fund pro-
portion in total wealth by 1.3% and 0.67%, respectively (Table 4.8, Column 5 and 6). The
financial risk attitude has insignificant impact on the investment depth of both products, but
their directions are the same with those in the baseline model. All other controls also seem
to have the consistent results with baseline model, including household heads’ age, gender,
and education, as well as household’s features.
4.7 Conclusion
In the past decades, researchers are committed to investigate the underlying mech-
anism of the decision-making incentives. As major participants of economic activities,
households’ financial behavior has long been discussed as the need of seeking solutions
to regulate the market. Contributing to large body of literature, our paper explores how
two domains of risk attitude influence households’ investment behaviors differently. We
investigate this topic at a special period, providing empirical evidence that the risk attitude,
in both general and finance sense, is one of the key determinants of risky investment. The
financial risk attitude reacts more sensitive towards the market change.
Our results indicate that risk averse persons in general facet not only have lower incen-
tives to participate in stock and fund market, but also allocate less wealth on risky assets.
Those who are generally risk averse have 18% and 11% lower possibilities of purchasing
stocks and funds, and also allocate 1.5% and 0.7% less of their assets on them, respectively.
Using three times of annual income as a cutoff to proxy for debt tolerance, those who are
more risk averse in finance facet have the higher incentives to purchase both stocks and
funds. Financial risk attitude also affects the participation depth of both products, but its
impact is more sensitive to the market condition compared to risk attitude in general facet.
This finding is supported by the evidence that high- and low- financial risk averse persons
are indifferent in stock investment decision and depth in downturn condition.
For other findings, middle-income households prefer stocks to funds. In contrast, the
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high-income households prefer the funds with a moderate return and risk, because they
potentially have lower incentives to gain marginal returns. The higher living burden and
faster life pace in the large cities create motivation to purchase products with relatively
stable returns, so funds are preferred. One thing needing to be mentioned is that our samples
only focus on the profit-driven investors in a specific market condition. We believe that the
influencing mechanism of entertainment-driven investors should be different, so further
research on this topic is also valuable.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION
Besides the objective constraints and condition, human being plays a more and more
important role in economy activities through decision-making and action-taking, so human
capital has the prolonged impact on different aspects of national economy from individual-
level to firm-level. As the important economy participants, the strategy taken by the cor-
porations and households would largely influence the wealth accumulation, social welfare,
market regulation and so on. Therefore, investigating how their human capital is accumu-
lated, and how to precisely measure their human capital would be of great value.
Based on this framework, we did two essays on firm-level research, and one on household-
level human capital. In chapter 2, we investigate how firm’s executives’ managerial human
capital, accumulated via learning-by-doing, would influence firm’s productivity. By con-
sidering the daily operation process, the executives, especially CEO and top management
team (TMT), play important roles in making decision, as well as leading and implementing
the strategical plans. As the results imply, CEO’s special experiences significantly influ-
ence firm’s production efficiency. Among all these special backgrounds, overseas and ca-
reer experiences in various functions play important roles, due to their reflection of CEO’s
cognitive skills, management ability, personality, and so on. They either increase or re-
duce a firm’s TFP level by 5%-10%, respectively, which is notably large in magnitude.
TMT’s composition is also important in terms of two potential channels. Team collabo-
ration conflicts, measured by characteristics and experience diversity (age/tenure), signif-
icantly hinders TFP improvement. Larger proportion of females and educated members
spurs TFP level. We also examined that the impacts of leadership’s human capital on TFP
are heterogeneous across different types of sub-industries.
As we verified in the first essay, technology innovation is one of the important chan-
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nels to raise TFP, so we further investigate whether and how decision-makers’ human cap-
ital influences corporate innovation propensity. CEO and BOD play major roles in firm’s
strategical decision-making, so we use their previous experiences to explore their impacts
on firm’s R&D investment. CEO’s overseas and innovation-related experiences signifi-
cantly increase R&D input ratio by around 2 and 1.5 percentage points, while production
and finance experiences hinder R&D to asset ratio by 1.5-2%, respectively. The impacts
magnitudes are comparable to around 75% of the average R&D input level. For board of
directors, R&D ratio is notably impeded by 0.05 percent points for every 10% more BOD
members with the previous government background, while marketing members promote
TFP notably.
At household-level research in Chapter 4, we find that risk averse persons in general
sense have lower incentives to purchase either stocks or funds with a slightly larger impact
when in market downturn. After controlling for general risk attitude, financial risk aversion,
reflected by lower debt tolerance, discourages both the stock and fund participation which
is more sensitive towards market change than the general measure. For investment depth,
general risk aversion negatively affects the investment amount in both stocks and funds
with a larger and more notable impact on stocks. Financial risk aversion still impedes
the investment depth of both products, but its impact on stocks is insignificant due to its
sensitive reaction to market turbulence. Both types of risk attitude have relatively smaller
impacts on fund due its larger risk than stock.
Our research provides empirical evidence and discussion on how to assign an inno-
vative and efficient executive team based on members’ past experiences. When assigning
best-fit executives, firm should also consider its own specific features. For instance, high-
tech firms focus more on inventing the tech-intensive products, so CEOs with innovation
and internalization horizon are valued. The priority of traditional manufacturing firms is
optimizing the operation and production process, so executives with richer general experi-
ences are preferred. We also provide discussion on how to predict and guide household’s
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financial behavior based on household heads’ specific personality traits.
In the future research, some topics have the potentials to be further discussed. In
this research, we identified the contribution magnitudes of each CEO experience on TFP
(the proportion of TFP explained by certain experience). Therefore, we can get a unique
aggregate human capital index for each CEO. These kinds of indices are not limited to
the productivity, but also apply to other aspects, such as innovation human capital index
based on R&D investment. We can adopt these indices to compare the level of innovation
propensity and management capacity across individuals, so firm can use it to select a best-fit





APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 TFP Estimation
Panel A: Definition and Descriptive Statistics for Variables in TFP Estimation
Several input/output factors are measured in money value. To keep the comparable mea-
sures, we deflate output and intermediates with Producer Price Index (PPI), and deflate
capital stock with Price Indices of Investment in Fixed Assets (FAI Price Index).
Variables Measures/Definition 2008 2012 2016
Output Operating Revenue 1.99 2.26 2.84
Yit (Billion RMB, deflated) (3.04) (3.37) (4.28)
Capital Net Fixed Assets 0.74 0.86 1.24
Kit (Billion RMB, deflated) (1.04) (1.43) (2.86)
Labor Number of Employees 2,536 2,560 2,957
Lit (2,152) (2,318) (3,121)
Intermediate Construction Material 1.69 1.89 2.18
Mit (Billion RMB, deflated) (2.74) (3.07) (3.47)
* We do not have the info of value-added, so adopting annual operating revenue to measure the output.
* PPI uses 1985 as the base year; FAI price index uses 1990 as the base year.
* Due to lacking direct measure for intermediates, we calculate it by following some Chinese literature:
Intermediates = operating cost + three major expenses – employees remuneration – fixed assets depreciation.
* Statistics in the first line for each variable is the mean, and in (.) is the standard deviation.
Panel B: TFP Estimation Results
OP LP ACF
ln(labor) 0.1101*** 0.1026*** 0.1124***
(0.0085) (0.0113) (0.0014)
ln(capital) 0.0399*** 0.1513*** 0.0511***
(0.0111) (0.0218) (0.0059)
ln(intermediates) 0.8319*** 0.7214*** 0.8404***
(0.0086) (0.0318) (0.0033)
β̂k + β̂l + β̂m 0.9819 0.9753 1.0039
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A.2 IV Selection Strategies and Assumptions in TFP Chapter
1. Baseline Model (RE-IV)
tfpi,t = β1CEOi,t + β2TMTi,t + β3fvi,t + β4fci +DIndi + Γt + ci + εi,t
(1) Endogenous variables: CEOi,t (Overseas and functional experiences);
(2) IV selection:
• Internal IV: IV1 = [ ¨fv1i,t, ¨fv3i,t];
• External IV: IV2 = [oi,t, pi,t, fi,t,mi,t, ii,t].
(3) IV assumptions:
• E (IV1 ′ CEOi,t) 6= 0 and E (IV2 ′ CEOi,t) 6= 0;
• E (IV ′1vi,t) = 0, where vi,t = ci + εi,t.
Based on the Hausman-Taylor method, all time-demeaned time-variate variables are














• E(IV ′2vi,t) = 0, where vi,t = ci + εi,t.
2. Dynamic Panel Model (RE-IV)
tfpi,t = γ · tfpi,t−1 + β1CEOi,t + β2TMTi,t + β3fvi,t + β4fci +DIndi + Γt + ci + εi,t
(1) Endogenous variables:
• CEOi,t: The same as in the static model;
• tfpi,t−1: Due to its inclusion of ci.
(2) IV selection:
• IV from baseline model: IVs = [ ¨fv1i,t, ¨fv3i,t, oi,t, pi,t, fi,t,mi,t, ii,t];
• Extra internal IV for tfpi,t−1: IV3 = [∆tfpi,t−1].
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(3) The validity of ∆tfpi,t−1 (Idea from Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond, system-GMM)
• CEO experiences rarely change overtime, so we simply assume ∆CEOi,t = 0.
• By doing first-difference on dynamic panel equation for tfpi,t−1, we have:
∆tfpi,t−1 = γ ·∆tfpi,t−2 + β ·∆xi,t−1 + ∆εi,t−1
where β ·∆xi,t−1 = β2 ·∆TMTi,t + β3 ·∆fvi,t.









(γ ·∆tfpi,t−2 + β ·∆xi,t−1 + ∆εi,t−1)′ εi,t
]
= 0



























A.3 First Stage Results of RE-IV Method
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A.4 The Classification of Sub-industry
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APPENDIX B
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 The Structure of the Database and Sample Firms
Panel A: The Number of Firms by Years in the Sample








* Though we drop the two-year samples during 2008-2016, there are three firms in the dataset listed on stock
market during 2009 to 2010 (they actually lasted three years in our original dataset, from 2008-2010). We
keep these firms because their one and two period lagged controls are available. (the earliest available info of
the controls is for the year 2007).










* After dropping the one- and two-year samples, the delisted firms in 2008 and 2009 are dropped, and the
newly listed firms in 2015 and 2016 are also dropped.
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B.2 R&D Expenditure Ratio by Industrial Sub-categories
* The classification of sub-category in manufacturing industry is listed in Appendix A.4.
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B.3 The Descriptive Statistics of CEO Turnover
Panel A: CEO Turnover by Year (Number of firms changed their CEO)
Year Change Not Change Total Percent Change
2009 151 690 841 17.95%
2010 150 800 950 15.79%
2011 170 1,030 1,200 14.17%
2012 208 1,166 1,374 15.16%
2013 233 1,225 1,458 15.98%
2014 226 1,269 1,486 15.12%
2015 264 1,317 1,581 16.70%
2016 273 1,302 1,575 17.33%
Any Change 1,001 592 1,593 62.84%
* “Any change” means if the firm changed its CEO at least once during 2009-2016.
Panel B: CEO Turnover Frequency








* “Times” means the frequency of CEO turnover during 2009-2016.
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B.4 IV Selection Strategies and Assumptions in R&D Chapter
1. Baseline Model (RE-IV)
RDi,t = β1CEOi,t + β2TMTi,t + β3fvi,t + β4fci +DIndi +DY eart + ci + εi,t
(1) Endogenous variables: CEOi,t;
(2) IV selection:
• Time-demeaned Variables: IV 1 = [ ¨fv1i,t, b̈1i,t, b̈3i,t, b̈4i,t];
• Lagged variables: IV2 = [fv1i,t−2, b1i,t−1, b2i,t−1, b3i,t−1, b4i,t−1].
(3) IV assumptions:
• E (IV1 ′ CEOi,t) 6= 0 and E (IV2 ′ CEOi,t) 6= 0;
• E (IV ′1vi,t) = 0, where vi,t = ci + εi,t.
Based on the Hausman-Taylor method, all time-demeaned time-variate variables are































• E(IV ′2vi,t) = 0, where vi,t = ci + εi,t.
2. Dynamic Panel Model (RE-IV)
RDi,t = γ ·RDi,t−1 + β1CEOi,t + β2TMTi,t + β3fvi,t + β4fci +DIndi +DY eart + ci + εi,t
(1) Endogenous variables:
• CEOi,t: The same as in the static model;
• RDi,t−1: Due to its inclusion of ci.
(2) IV selection:
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• IV from the baseline model:
IVs = [ ¨fv1i,t, b̈1i,t, b̈3i,t, b̈4i,t, fv1i,t−2, b1i,t−1, b2i,t−1, b3i,t−1, b4i,t−1];
• Extra internal IV for RDi,t−1: IV3 = [∆RDi,t−1].
(3) The validity of ∆RDi,t−1 (Idea from Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond, system-GMM)
• CEO experiences rarely change overtime, so we simply assume ∆CEOi,t = 0.
• By doing first-difference on dynamic panel equation for RDi,t−1, we have:
∆RDi,t−1 = γ ·∆RDi,t−2 + β ·∆xi,t−1 + ∆εi,t−1
where β ·∆xi,t−1 = β2 ·∆BODi,t + β3 ·∆fvi,t.









(γ ·∆RDi,t−2 + β ·∆xi,t−1 + ∆εi,t−1)′ εi,t
]
= 0
• By doing FD, ci is removed from the instrument, so E(∆RD
′
i,t−1ci) = 0.






















APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Theoretical Model Specification and Derivation
1. Investment Proportion Model Setup
• Utility function: We assume a CRRA risk preference with the following utility function
U (W ) =
W 1−γ
1− γ
* γ is the degree of risk aversion, γ ∈ (−∞,∞). Larger γ implies more risk averse.
* W is the household wealth, so U ≥ 0 and U (W ) > 0.
• Utility maximization:
max [(1− π)U (Wd) + πU (Wu)]
* π: The possibility that the price of certain risky portfolio would go up;
* Wi: The end-of-period wealth of the individual; i = d or u, and d means the risky
asset price goes down, while u means the price would go up.
• End-of-term wealth:





, i = u, d
* Assuming the risk-free interest rate is 0;
* w: Initial wealth level;
* h: The proportion of total assets that are invested in risky assets;
* ri: The change rate of risky asset price, d means going down, u means going up;
• Re-write the optimization problem:
max
[(1− π)(w(1 + hrd))1−γ + π(w(1 + hru))1−γ]
1− γ
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s.t. 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
rd < 0 < ru
(1− π)rd + πru > 0
• F.O.C of objective function w.r.t. h:
(1− π)(w(1 + hrd))











2. “Whether participate or not” Model Setup
• Plugging the optimal risky-asset investment proportion h∗ back into the objective func-









where A = (1−π)(1 + hrd)1−γ +π(1 + hru)1−γ = (
ru − rd
mru − rd
)1−γ[(1−π)m1−γ +π] > 0
• The end-of-term value function of the investor Vp = U(wp), where the wp is the end-of-




Since alpha = A
1
1−γ and A > 0, then alpha > 0.
• To determine whether to invest in the risk-asset, we have the criteria that the expected
excess gains in wealth should be larger than the fixed cost c of risky investment:
wp − w = (α− 1)w > c
• We assume c has a cumulative distribution function (CDF)G(c), then the potential risky-
asset participation probability P is:
P = G[(α− 1)w]
* The CDF G(c) is a monotonic increasing function with c, indicating that G′(.) > 0.
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[48] Escribá-Esteve, A., Sánchez-Peinado, L., Sánchez-Peinado, E. (2009). The influence
of top management teams in the strategic orientation and performance of small and
medium-sized enterprises. British Journal of Management, 20(4), 581-597.
[49] Fama, E. F., Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal
of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
[50] Fan, S., Wang, C. (2019). Firm age, ultimate ownership, and R&D investment. Inter-
national Review of Economics and Finance.
[51] Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., Petersen, B. C. (1987). Financing constraints and corpo-
rate investment (No. w2387). National Bureau of Economic Research.
[52] Feng, L., Seasholes, M. S. (2005). Do investor sophistication and trading experience
eliminate behavioral biases in financial markets?. Review of Finance, 9(3), 305-351.
[53] Fernandes, D., Lynch Jr, J. G., Netemeyer, R. G. (2014). Financial literacy, financial
education, and downstream financial behaviors. Management Science, 60(8), 1861-
1883.
[54] Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C. (1996). Strategic leadership: Top executives and
their effects on organizations. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing Company.
[55] Fisher, F. M., Temin, P. (1973). Returns to scale in research and development: What
does the Schumpeterian hypothesis imply?. Journal of Political Economy, 81(1), 56-
70.
[56] Fitzsimmons, T. W., Callan, V. J. (2016). CEO selection: A capital perspective. The
Leadership Quarterly, 27(5), 765-787.
[57] Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42.
[58] Galasso, A., Simcoe, T. S. (2011). CEO overconfidence and innovation. Management
Science, 57(8), 1469-1484.
[59] Gomes, F., Michaelides, A. (2005). Optimal life-cycle asset allocation: Understand-
117
ing the empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 60(2), 869-904.
[60] Griliches, Z. (1979). Issues in assessing the contribution of research and development
to productivity growth. The Bell Journal of Economics, 92-116.
[61] Grinblatt, M., Keloharju, M., Linnainmaa, J. (2011). IQ and stock market participa-
tion. The Journal of Finance, 66(6), 2121-2164.
[62] Guiso, L., Jappelli, T. (2005). Awareness and stock market participation. Review of
Finance, 9(4), 537-567.
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